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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann
§78A-4-103.

2

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The language Rodney Grgich uses in his Issues Presented for Review, and in
his Standards of Review such as "will assess the quality and quantity of the evidence"
indicate that he is challenging the adequacy of the trial court's findings of fact as well
as the sufficiency of the evidence used by the trial court to support its findings
concerning the division of marital property and the award of attorney's fees to his wife
Sharon Grgich.
Concerning challenges to a trial court's findings of fact, the Advisory Committee
Notes to Utah to Rule 24 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure states:
Rule 24(a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts have long held. See In re
Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994); Newmeyerv. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d
1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). "To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact,
appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. 'Attorneys must extricate
themselves from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In
order to properly discharge the marshalling duty..., the challenger must present, in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists.'"
ONEIDA/SLIC, v. ONEIDA Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051,
1052-53 (Utah App. 1994) (alteration in original)(quoting West Valley City v.
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991)).
"On appeal, it is the burden of the party seeking to overturn the trial court's
decision to 'marshal' the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that
despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be
'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'"
Hagan v.Hagan, 810 P.2d 478 at 481 (Utah App. 1991J (citing Myers v. Myers, 768
P.2d 979, 984 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted)
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In his Appellate Brief, Rodney has neither marshaled the evidence in support of
the trial court's findings nor demonstrated that such findings are clearly erroneous,
citing instead only to the carefully selected evidence from the second trial that
supports the outcome he desires. Rodney made no reference to the evidence, the
findings, or the legal conclusions of the first trial court even though the second trial
court stated on page one of its Minute Entry:
This Order was entered, because in the original divorce real property was awarded
which had been titled in part in the names of the interveners and they were not then parties to
the action. With the exception of the foregoing, the Court adopts the Memorandum Decision
of Judge Kouris, dated January 7,2008, with respect to all of its findings and legal
conclusions, excepting only the foregoing. (R 286)
"[P]arties that fail to marshal the evidence do so at the risk that the reviewing
court will decline, in its discretion, to review the trial court's factual findings." Beesley v.
Harris (In re Estate of Beesley), 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994).
Accordingly, this Court should view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
district court and assume that the factual findings are sufficiently supported by the
evidence presented at trial. Rodney's complete failure to marshal the evidence when
challenging the trial court's findings must be fatal to his appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Rodney and Sharon Grgich were married in May, 1967 and remained living
together until September 2006. (R. 4 - 5) During those 39 1/3 years, Sharon bore and
raised their 5 children into adulthood. As intimated in Rodney's brief, Sharon and
Rodney lived and worked on the Grgich family farm for the 10 years after their 1967
marriage. (R. 404 Pg 186 Ln 14 - 17) Between 1977 and 1993 they moved around
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the Tooele valley several times working on the farm occasionally and living mostly in
other locations.
Beginning in 1967 and continuing through 2006 when she fed the cows while
Rodney was in the hospital, Sharon worked on the farm to include moving sprinkler
pipes, planting potatoes, driving trucks and tractors, hauling dead cows and manure,
and helping with the harvests. (R. 404 Pg 186 Ln 1 - 25, Pg 201- Pg 203)
Upon the death of Rodney's father in 1989, Rodney and Sharon together took
the joint physical possession of the 26.8 acres of land, the appurtenant water rights,
and the farm equipment referred to in this matter collectively as the farm property.
In January 1990, Rodney received a conveyance of the record title to the farm
and the appurtenant water rights from his father's estate. The next day Rodney
executed the quitclaim deed for the farm property from himself to himself and three of
his five children as joint tenants. The validity of that deed is the major subject of this
appeal.
In 1993, the Grgich family moved back into the trailer home located on the
farm. Rodney and Sharon lived in the trailer home until the parties' separation in
anticipation of divorce. During that time, all of the farm trailer's utilities drastically
deteriorated to the point of inoperability. (R. 404 Pg 177 Ln 25 - Pg 179 Ln 17) After
the separation, Sharon stayed in the trailer so that she has lived continuously in the
trailer home on the farm since 1993 through today. (R. 404 Pg 177 Ln 22 - 23) The
first trial court addressed the deplorable living conditions in the farm trailer as follows:
While living on the farm to fulfill Rodney's dream, Sharon was exposed to bestial
living conditions. The furnace in the parties' trailer home failed in 1993 and was
never repaired. The plumbing in the trailer is in disrepair and continues to deteriorate.
There is no water available in the kitchen. The water continuously leaked around the
5

base of the water heater, ultimately causing the water heater to fall through the floor. Water
also rotted the bottom of the stove, causing Sharon to disconnect it for safety sake.
Neither party has been able to shower in the trailer for the last 5 years. The trailer's
electricity was disconnected 5 years ago and never reconnected.
During this time, any money the parties had that could be used to fix these primitive
living conditions, was used to service the farm. For example, recently the parties had
saved $1,200.00 to reconnect the electricity. At that same time the hay liner (hay bail
wagon) was not working. Despite the upcoming winter, the parties decided to forego the
electricity and repair the hay liner. All the while, the parties continued to live
without heat, running water and electricity. Curiously, the parties somehow found the
money to feed the livestock, buy seed potatoes and other seeds and to continually repair
the aging farm equipment.
Since October 2006, Sharon has lived alone in this trailer with no utilities with the
exception of an extension cord plugged into a neighbor's socket. Sharon now showers
by filling a bucket with cold water, standing in a bathtub, and giving herself a sponge
bath. As well, she uses an ice chest for refrigeration and sustains herself with cold
sandwiches.
Besides these personal sacrifices, Sharon also supported this farm through the direct
efforts of her labor. At trial, Rodney attempted to minimize Sharon's work effort, but oft
times he contradicted his own deposition statements on the same subject. The parties'
offspring also dwarfed Sharon's work effort on the farm. However, cross examination
quickly revealed that the parties' children have aligned themselves with Rodney in this
matter and will reap financial benefits if Rodney prevails. For these reasons, this Court
finds Rodney and his children's statements lack credibility. (R. 54 - 53)
By the time the parties' separated in 2006, three of the five Grgich children had
aligned themselves with their father Rodney believing themselves to be in line to
personally share in the sizable proceeds from the sale of the Erda farm property. At
the first trial, Rodney produced his Exhibit #1 that listed his claimed V* share of the
land to be worth $250,000. (R. 390 Pg 82 Ln 5 - 16) See Addendum #2
At the time Rodney and Sharon separated, the three children's alignment with
Rodney included their paying his rent and utilities, providing him sheltered work and
unreported income and subsidizing his legal fees incurred during the divorce
proceeding. (R. 391 Pg 4 Ln 1 - 8) While aligned with Rodney, the three children had
6

been isolated from and alienated against Sharon to the point of giving testimony
detrimental to her that the trial court found lacked credibility. (R. 53) For the 12
months between November 2006, when Rodney filed the divorce complaint and the
first trial in November 2007, the three children continued to provide Rodney with rent
money for a modern trailer home complete with fully operating utilities, (R. 57) while
Sharon continued to live under bestial conditions in the old family trailer. (R. 54)
In his divorce complaint of November 2006, Rodney claimed the farm and cows
were solely his inherited property and asked the Court to award all of the property
solely to him, without any mention of the three children being co-owners with him or of
the property having been deeded into a Trust.
Shortly after Sharon filed her answer, Rodney changed his story and began
saying he had no ownership interest in the farm, water, equipment or cows because
they had all been deeded into a Trust. The response to each settlement offer Sharon
made before, during, and after the mediation session in August 2007, was that the
Trustees did not approve her offer.
Rodney continued to claim he had no ownership interest whatsoever in the
farm, water, equipment or cows because they had all been deeded into a Trust,
although each of Sharon's requests or demands to see the Trust documents made
over the year before the first trial, such as during his deposition in October, 2007, (R,
389 Pg 10 Ln 2 - 21) went unanswered by Rodney as did her requests made during
the first trial in November 2007.
During the entire first trial and all through the first session of the second trial,
Rodney steadfastly maintained that Sharon should receive nothing from the divorce
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action because everything he and Sharon had accumulated over the prior 40 years
belonged solely to him and he had put everything to include the farm land, the water,
the equipment, and all of the farm income (one half of which he had been ordered to
pay to Sharon) (R. 390 Pg 43 Ln 19 - 20) into "The Manda Irrevocable Trust" on
August 2, 2006, with the three children Rodney Grgich Jr., Brenda Gowans and
Brittney Grgich as the Trustees. (R. 105)
The parties' eldest daughter Brenda testified at the first trial that the Trust was
set up to provide for Sharon because Rodney had a bad heart and was expected to
pass on. (R. 404 Pg 172 Ln 8 - 11) Brenda also testified that the Trust had contained
a provision for Sharon to have a life estate in the farm and have her utilities provided
by the Trust, but that provision had been removed later on. (R. 404 Pg 172 Ln 15 23)
Brenda and Rodney testified that although the Trust was created to care for
Rodney and Sharon, and that it had received all of the farm income, the Trust never
provided any financial assistance to Sharon. (R. 404 Pg 167 Ln 8 - 15) and (R. 390
Pg 77 Ln 21 - 23)
The first trial court made findings in its memorandum decision that Sharon was
living in bestial conditions and was clearly in need of spousal support, but because
Rodney was in failing health and had only a limited retirement income that had already
been divided between him and Sharon after their separation, there was no alimony
award available, leaving only the division of the family farm and the associated
livestock and equipment to provide for the two parties' needs and to allow them to
pursue their separate lives. (R. 55)
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At the conclusion of the first trial, the court made an equitable division of the
assets between Rodney and Sharon, having discarded Rodney's unsupported
argument that the family farm and the associated livestock and equipment had
previously been placed into a Trust and was not available for division between Sharon
and Rodney. (R. 55 - 49)
After the first trial court announced its equitable division of the assets between
Rodney and Sharon, Rodney filed his Objection to the Findings and Decree on
February 4, 2008. At first Rodney filed his Objection making a statute of limitations
defense. (R. 60, U#2) The three children, wanting to intervene to claim their interests
in the property, appeared only after Rodney's objection to the first court's ruling, that
there was no legal basis for the alleged trust, was not disturbed after review.
The three children complained that they had not been given their legal right to
defend their property rights because they had not been a party to the divorce action
nor given any notice of the trial (R. 115 fl7). The children made this post-judgment
claim while admitting that although they had been aware of the ongoing litigation
between their parents and they knew it had been their right under the URCP to
intervene at any time during the divorce action before the final judgment had been
entered, they had "waited to find out if Judge Kouris would reverse his ruling..." (R.
113)
The three children objected to the ruling claiming the property distribution could
not be allowed to stand because they, as property interest holders, had the right to
intervene and had never been given any notice of the trial (R. 115 tf7). The children
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made this "no notice" claim even though from the outset of this action, the three
children:
(1) claimed to be the Trustees (that controlled all of the marital assets (R. 392 Pg
35 Ln 20 - 21)) of the alleged Manda Irrevocable Trust which had supposedly been
created to ensure Rodney and Sharon would have a comfortable life in their
advanced years (R. 391 Pg 17 Ln 11 - 25);
(2) had been presented with and had rejected multiple settlement offers from
Sharon while acting as Trustees (R. 391 Pg 26 Ln 22 - Pg 27 Ln 17); and
(3) Brenda Gowans, the oldest of the three children, had actually testified at the
first trial over Sharon's objections. (R. 34)
Over Sharon's objections, the court set aside those portions of the first divorce
decree that concerned the division of the marital assets between Rodney and Sharon
and gave the three children permission to intervene. This belated appearance of the
intervening children was the sole cause of the second trial.
After the children intervened, because of such things as their demands for time
to conduct an appraisal (that never happened) (R. 266) and for extended time to
appeal (that never happened) (R. 164) the case dragged on another 19 months before
the second trial began in June 2009.
Even though Rodney had from the outset of the second trial, repeated the claim
that he had steadfastly maintained during the entire first trial and all during the June
session of the second trial, that Sharon should receive no part of the farm land, water,
equipment or farm income because it had all been deeded into the Trust,(R. 390 Pg
85 Ln 3 - 24), on July 17, 2009, Rodney Grgich testified that during the prior week, he
had revoked the "Manda Irrevocable Trust." (R. 391 Pg 12 Ln 10 -15)
After conducting three sessions of the second trial and after having heard
Rodney abandon his "the trust owns everything" defense to Sharon being awarded an
10

equitable share of the marital property, and after having heard the three intervening
Grgich children claim that they together owned % of the farm's real property and
water, the second trial court entered its ruling declaring the 1990 Quitclaim Deed to be
invalid because when Rodney deeded the property to three of his children as joint
tenants with himself, he did not intend to convey a present interest in the property. (R
283)
The second trial court also found that by his use of the land from 1989 to the
present, his borrowing against the land with and without the children's participation, his
attempts to sell the land, and his keeping all of the proceeds, Rodney's conduct led
Sharon to believe that the 1989 quit-claim deed did not constitute a transfer at that time
and that he was therefore estopped from claiming that the 1989 quit-claim was a valid
transfer, or that either the legal principle of laches or the statute of limitations applied
to Sharon's claim for a martial interest in the farm property.
After the second trial, Rodney filed this appeal in October 2009. Mostly
because Rodney and the three children successfully stalled the production of the
transcripts of the first trial that Sharon needed to respond to this Appeal until the fourth
November after the divorce complaint had been filed, Sharon to this day, continues to
languish through yet another winter in the bestial conditions of the farm trailer due to
lack of money to improve her living conditions or even install the basic utilities of heat,
electricity, and running water because she has been left without enough money to do
otherwise. (R. 404 Pg 182 Ln 19 - 25)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Rodney Grgich brought before this Court five issues for review claiming that the
second trial court used insufficient evidence as the basis of its findings and made
errors in its ruling concerning the Statute of Limitations, made an inequitable
distribution of marital property and improperly awarded attorney's fees to Sharon
Grgich.
Throughout his appellant's brief, Rodney failed to make any measurable
attempt to marshal the evidence that is readily available in the record of the two trials
and even misrepresented the actual status of one of his five issues.
Conversely, Sharon has provided to this Court many references to the record
wherein substantial evidence exists to defeat Rodney's un-marshaled claims of errors
concerning the application of the Statute of Limitations. Sharon has also addressed
Rodney's unsupported claims of the inequitable distribution of marital property by
referring the Court to the facts developed during two trials on that issue.
Over the last four years, Rodney did not complain that his ex-wife, after raising
five children and 40 years of marriage, received no alimony award based upon his
lack of current income. Rodney did however, repeatedly demand throughout the trial
process that Sharon receive no portion of the assets accumulated during the parties'
marriage based upon his various reasons that were offered and then withdrawn when
investigated to any degree.
Over the last four years, Rodney was dishonest and evasive throughout the two
trials and the trial court found his sworn testimony to be not credible. (R. 282) In sum,
Rodney came to this appeal with completely unclean hands.
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Sharon has expended significant resources that she does not currently possess
in responding to Rodney's continuous campaign to keep her living in the most bestial
conditions and has asked this Court based upon her history of prevailing in each
action to allow her to recover both the award of fees she received from the second trial
court and the fees she has incurred in responding to this appeal.
ARGUMENT
I . STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT APPLY
A. Quiet Title Action Asserted by Interveners, Not by Sharon
Part A of Rodney's first argument claims Sharon did not assert a true Quiet
Title claim in order "to quiet an existing title against an adverse or hostile claim of
another." Rodney goes on to state "Interveners, rather that Appellee, would be the
party which would have asserted this claim because they had the existing title and the
adverse claim was Appellee's" The children demanded "to intervene in this matter so
that they may protect their property interest and assert their claims and defenses" (R.
113)
The second trial court correctly addressed Rodney's statute of limitations
defense in its Minute Entry findings by stating:
His control of the property included use of the land, borrowing against the land,
attempts to sell the land, and keeping all of the proceeds, and during this conduct from
1989 to the present he led his spouse, the respondent, to believe that the 1989 quit-claim
deed did not constitute a transfer at that time and by his conduct he is therefore estopped
from claiming that the 1989 quit-claim was a valid transfer, or that either the legal
principle of laches or the statute of limitations applies to her claim for an interest in the
property. See also Nolan v. Hoopiiana 2006 UT 53,144 P3d 1129. (R 283)
Sharon agrees with both of these statements in that, as Rodney correctly
states, Sharon never claimed to hold legal title to the farm, water, or equipment, but
13

rather, after 40 years of marriage, as the second trial court stated in its finding, she
claimed an "interest in the property" believing, as was stated in her answer to the
divorce complaint, that she was "entitled to receive1Aof the value of the martial estate
to include the real property she has lived on for the last 19 years and the herd of cattle
she has helped to feed over the same period of time.u (R. 12)
As Rodney affirmed in the third paragraph of his argument, it was the three
intervening Grgich children, not Sharon, that brought the alleged Quiet Title action to
life. The children's demand to perfect an existing title against Sharon's hostile claim
(for her marital interest in the farm) was made by the children based upon a quitclaim
deed Rodney granted from himself to himself and the three children as joint tenants in
January 1990. (R. 108)
However, as the second trial court ultimately and correctly ruled, the 1990 deed
was void, thus had no legal efficacy. "A thing is void which is done against law at the
very time of doing it, and where no person is bound by the act." See, e.g., Mut.
Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Winne, 20 Mont. 20, 49 P. 446, 449 (1897) In Ockey v.
Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, 189 P.3d 51, the Utah Supreme Court wrote in U 10, "A contract
or a deed that is void cannot be ratified or accepted, and anyone can attack its validity
in court."
Because the trial court properly found that the 1990 deed was void, the three
children never acquired any ownership interest in the farm at any time and Sharon had
every legal right to attack the deed's validity in court, regardless of the passage of time
or lack of notice to the children, thus defeating Rodney's statute of limitations defense.
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Further, because the deed was void (as described in detail below), both trial
courts had the duty, not just the ability to determine the distribution of the marital
property consisting of the farm, water, and equipment, regardless of how much time
had passed between Rodney's creation of the invalid deed and the entry of the
divorce decree and regardless of the children's claim of needing adequate notice to
protect their interests.
B. Claim is still Not Barred by Statute of Limitations
The second paragraph of Part B of Rodney's first argument correctly identifies
the trial court's invalidation of the January 25, 1990 Quitclaim Deed as the actual legal
issue for which he is requesting appellate review. However in that second paragraph,
Rodney simply states without citation, supporting argument or any legal analysis,
"[tjhat claim is subject to the statute of limitations, and therefore, barred."
While Rodney devotes several paragraphs of his brief to the premises that the
statute of limitations does not apply to actions where the claimant is in actual
possession of the property as held by the Utah Supreme Court in Bangerter v. Petty,
225 P.3d 874 (Utah 2009), all such argument is not pertinent here because Sharon
did not assert a Quiet Title claim. However, had Sharon asserted a Quiet Title claim,
no statute of limitations would apply here because Sharon was in actual possession of
the property in question for the 13 years immediately prior to the filing of this divorce
action by Rodney. (R. 404 Pg 177 Ln 22 - 23)
Contra to the unsupported statement made in Rodney's argument that Sharon
was not in possession of the farm, Sharon and Rodney lived on the farm continuously
from 1993 until they separated in October 2006. At the time of, and after the parties'
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separation, Sharon remained living on the farm where she remains today, while
Rodney moved to town and lived in a trailer provided for him rent free by the three
intervening children. (R. 404 Pg 31 Ln 8 -10)
Despite Rodney's unsupported claims in his argument that Sharon "did not pay
the taxes or pay the mortgage," she has been in actual possession of the farm
continuously since 1993, in that her actual possession exists where the property is in
her immediate occupancy and physical control. See Black's Law Dictionary 841 (6th
ed. 1990) Until Rodney moved to Tooele in October 2006, he and Sharon shared joint
actual possession of the property, after which, Sharon assumed the sole actual
possession. Id.
Concerning Rodney's argument that Sharon "did not pay the taxes or pay the
mortgage,"the first trial court stated:
There is no question that, throughout this marriage, Sharon significantly
participated in the workings of the farm. Equally as clear, is the fact that Sharon was
not compensated for her work as a "farm hand" would be paid. Instead, Sharon and
Rodney received compensation similar to that of any business owner. The profits or
losses were co-mingled into the couple's personal household finances. (R.52)
Such co-mingling would prove that Sharon's contributions to the enterprise
must be given equal credit to those of Rodney, to include the payment of taxes and
the mortgage.
The last paragraph of Part B contains the sentence "[t]he thai court treated the
water rights the same as the farm property"followed by the sentence "Any claim for
the water rights should be barred by the statute of limitations."
Rodney's first statement concerning the treatment of the water rights by the trial
court is correct but creates no controversy because in Utah, title to water rights is
16

adjudicated in the same fashion as title to real property. See Church v. Meadow
Springs Ranch Corp., 659 P.2d 1045, 1048 (Utah 1983). However, Rodney's followon claim of a statute of limitations bar to litigation of the ownership status of the water
rights, again made without citation, supporting argument or any legal analysis, simply
has no merit.
Rodney acquired the water rights appurtenant to the farm as an inheritance
from his father (R. 404 Pg 37 Ln 4) via the same personal representative's deed that
conveyed the land to him. (R. 111 -110) Rodney's purported transfer of an ownership
interest in the water appurtenant to the farm from himself to the three children was
evidenced solely by the Quitclaim Deed of January 25, 1990. See Addendum #3.
Therefore, the validity of any transfer of ownership interests in the water rights
appurtenant to the farm was subject to the very same analysis by the trial court as was
the validity of the same Quitclaim Deed for the farm land. Because the 1990 quitclaim
deed was determined to be void, the three children never acquired any interest in the
water at any time and Sharon had every legal right to attack the children's claims to
the water regardless of the passage of time or lack of notice to the children, thus
defeating Rodney's second statute of limitations defense.
II.

THERE WAS ADEQUATE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE
THAT THE 1990 QUITCLAIM DEED WAS INVALID
Rodney's second argument claims Sharon did not present clear and convincing

evidence to the second trial court that the deed was invalid. Rodney goes on to state
the dispute is whether Rodney "delivered the deed to the Interveners/Appellants with
the present intent to transfer"
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In Utah, a quitclaim deed has the effect of a conveyance only when "executed
as required by law." Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-13 (1994). This has been interpreted to
mean that a deed must be in writing, see Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1995); signed by
the creator, see id.; 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 34 (1956); supported by consideration, see
Cereghino v. Einberg, 4 Utah 514, 11 P. 568 (Utah 1886); and delivered to the
grantee.
There was never any evidence presented at any time that Rodney received any
consideration from the three very young children (daughter was 6 years old R. 390 Pg
49 Ln 22) in exchange for his execution and delivery of the quitclaim deed. Rodney's
deposition testimony was that the children paid him nothing for the deed to the farm.
(R. 389 Pg 7 Ln 3 - 7) Without evidence of consideration from the children to Rodney,
the quitclaim deed lacks the effect of a conveyance thus was invalid for lack of
consideration.
The first trial court never ruled on the issue of the validity of the 1990 quitclaim
deed because Rodney never mentioned to anyone that the children had any interest
in the farm until after the first trial court ruled that:
When considering all "pertinent circumstances" including: the amount and kind of
property (land, water shares and farming equipment); the parties standard of living and
financial conditions (desperate for both parties); their needs; their earning capabilities (little
if any); the length of the marriage (close to 40 years); and what Sharon has given up for this
marriage (see above):
This Court finds it equitable that one-half of the interest and ownership that
Rodney had in the farm land, the associated water rights, and farm equipment
when Rodney inherited it from his father in 1989 is granted to Sharon, (R 39)
Further, at trial some evidence was produced alleging that the farm, water rights and
farm equipment has been subsequently transferred into a trust and are therefore
inaccessible for property distribution by this Court. In fact, NO documents were entered
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into evidence verifying the existence of this trust. This trust is not recorded by the
appropriate county recorder or any other governmental entity against these assets. Finally,
the trial unearthed many facts that question the motivation and legitimacy of the alleged
trust. These irregularities include: transferring tractors into the names of children who were
nine, five and one year(s) old at the time of the transfer; transferring livestock into the
trust three months prior to filing for divorce without an accompanying required "brand
inspection" or any other legal indicia of a transfer; and Rodney's transferring all of his assets
into the trust without compensation and without retaining sufficient assets to satisfy his
outstanding obligations. Therefore, this Court also finds:
There is no legal basis for the alleged trust discussed in trial, therefore this
Court has the ability to equitably divide said assets. (R 38) See Addendum #1.
At the conclusion of the second trial that included the three children as
interveners, and having heard Rodney abandon his prior "the Trust owes everything"
defense to the distribution of marital assets to Sharon on July 17, 2009, the second
trial court addressed the evidence presented concerning the invalid nature of
Rodney's 1990 quitclaim deed and the children's relationship to the subject property
by stating in its findings,:
One who asserts the invalidity of a deed must prove the invalidity by clear and
convincing evidence. The deed in question was signed and recorded, and therefore was
presumed to be delivered. The quit-claim deed was not secret, and respondent learned of
it sometime after the transfer and many years before the start of the divorce action...
The only person who has control of this real property since 1989 is the petitioner. He
has borrowed against the property without the children's knowledge or consent, and
sometimes with one or two children's knowledge and consent, and over the objections of
another child. He has always done what he wanted with the property. Only petitioner has
taken profits from the property, the children have never shared in any profits or any
deductions. Had petitioner intended present conveyance in 1989, his use of the property
without the participation of the other joint tenants would have violated Utah law.
When petitioner deeded the property to three of his children as joint tenants with
himself, he did not intend to convey a present interest in the property. (R 284 - 283)

(emphasis added)
In sum, the second trial court ruled the 1990 quitclaim deed was invalid.
Black's Law Dictionary defines INVALID to mean "not of legal efficacy" or the
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equivalent of void and defines VOID to mean "an instrument which is wholly
ineffective, inoperative, and incapable of ratification and which thus has no force or
effect so that nothing can cure it." (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 841 (6th ed. 1990)
Because the 1990 quitclaim deed was void, such as is a void judgment, it is
one which from its inception is, and forever continues to be of no legal force and effect
whatsoever. Id.
The second court found the 1990 quitclaim deed to be void because Rodney
did not intend to convey a present interest in the property when he deeded the
property to three of his children as joint tenants with himself. (R. 283)
The Utah Court of Appeals addressed this issue in detail by stating in the
Anderson v. Brinkerhoff ruling:
When a deed is executed with no intent to transfer a present interest in
property, it is invalid. Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632, 635 (Utah 1984). Courts
have consistently held that a conveyance is valid only upon delivery of a deed
with the present intent to transfer. Baker, 684 P.2d at 635. Intention is the
essence of delivery and is of primary and controlling importance. Lenhart v.
Desmond, 705 P.2d 338, 342 (Wyo.1985). The grantor's present intent must be
to pass his or her title interest to the grantee and divest himself of the same;
otherwise the purported deed is not valid or effective. Den-Gar Enter, v. Romero,
94 N.M. 425, 611 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Ct.App.1980). Anderson v. Brinkerhoff756
P.2d 95, 100 (Utah App. 1988)
As Rodney stated in his Issues Presented for Review #2, for him to challenge
the "quality and quantity" of the evidence concerning the invalid nature of the 1990
quitclaim deed, Rodney "must begin by undertaking the arduous and painstaking
marshaling process." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
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Although in Rodney's argument, he states that "[tjhere was considerable
evidence taken at trial to ascertain Petitioner/Appellant's intent" to transfer a present
interest to the children when he executed the deed, in his brief, Rodney has
completely failed "to present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, any scrap of
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the findings he resists." Rather
than present every scrap of competent evidence available as required, Rodney's brief
made no reference whatsoever to the evidence presented, nor to the findings, nor to
the legal conclusions of the first trial court and provided scant and very guardedly
selected citations to the record of the second trial.
In his argument, having made no effort to marshal the evidence that was
presented to either trial court, Rodney made one single citation to the record from the
second trial to support his contention that "Appellee did not present clear and
convincing evidence that the 1990 quitclaim was invalid" when he wrote that "As the
minute entry states, Petitioner/Appellant transferred the farm property 'for the purpose
of receiving favorable property tax and inheritance tax treatment/ (R. 280)."
However, Rodney's cited page (R. 280) makes no mention whatsoever about
"Petitioner/Appellant transferred the farm property for the purpose of receiving
favorable property tax and inheritance tax treatment"
The second trial court's minute entry does state on page 4:
When petitioner deeded the property to three of his children as joint tenants with
himself, he did not intend to convey a present interest in the property. The deed was for
some other purpose, possibly tax or inheritance treatment, but in his testimony, Mr.
Grgich made it clear he was following the advice of a relative and did not understand
what the legal effect of the transfer would be with respect to property taxes or inheritance
taxes, and in fact it appeared that what understanding he does have is directly contrary to the
actual effect that said transfer would have had. (R. 283)
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Because Rodney utterly failed to marshal any evidence, Sharon takes this
opportunity to inform this Court that contra to Rodney's assertion, the evidence that
was presented to the two trial courts as follows, clearly and convincingly established
Rodney had no intent whatsoever to transfer a present ownership interest in the farm
to three of his children via the Quitclaim Deed dated January 25, 1990.
In November 2006, Rodney stated in his Verified Divorce Complaint that he
"shall be awarded the sole possession, right title and interest of the property he
inherited which is located Erda, Utah, and the cattle which he inherited and owns." (R.
2-3) (emphasis added)
In his divorce complaint, Rodney mentioned nothing whatsoever about having
three Joint Tenant co-owner's of the farm. Nor did the complaint filed in November
2006, mention anything whatsoever about the "The Manda Irrevocable Trust" into
which all of the farm property had allegedly been deeded or transferred on August 2,
2006. (R. 105)
One year later, during his deposition on October 31, 2007, Rodney claimed
under oath that he had no ownership interest whatsoever in the farm land, water, or
equipment when he testified:

Buhler
Rodney

Q. Who are the trustees?
A. Okay, my oldest daughter, Brenda K. Gowans; Rodney Jr.,
and Brittney K.
Q. They're the trustees?
A. They're trustees and they're also the owners.
Q. And you're not?
A. I'm not.
Q. So you have no ownership interest in the farm?
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A. Not anymore. I'm out of it. Since a year ago, 2nd of August, it
would be 2006.
Q. And so the trustees are the beneficiaries?
A. Yes.
Q. And you claim no ownership interest in that farm
whatsoever?
A. None at all.
(R. 389 Pg 6 Ln 1 - Pg 7 Ln 2) (emphasis added)
One year after that testimony, on November 15, 2007, during his direct
examination at the first trial, Rodney made the following statements:
Broadhead
Rodney

Q. Why did you put Brenda, Brittney and Rodney, Jr. on the deed?
A. Tax purposes. It's a direct inheritance. They won't have to go because
it's survivorship, they would not have to go through probate on it. . .
Q. So you did that for tax purposes and for inheritance purposes?
A. Right, inheritance, too.
(R. 404 Pg 39 Ln 12 - 24) (emphasis added)

At that first trial, during his cross examination conducted by Sharon's attorney,
Rodney made the following statements:
Buhler
Rodney

Q. You testified that when you did that {Recorded the Quit Claim Deed}
you did that for tax purposes?
A. Right.
Q. You did is so that if you died the children would inherit it? That for tax
purposes and for inheritance purposes?
A. Right.
Q. You had no intention of giving that land to them in their ownership
on that day, did you?
A. They could have had it immediately. It didn't had nothing to do with it.
Q. Sir?
A. If I passed away one minute after I signed that, they could have
had it, no problem.
Q. Exactly, they could have had it after you were dead?
A. Right. (R. 404 Pg 92 Ln 20 - Pg 93 Ln 11)
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In addition to Rodney's testimony at the deposition and two trials, his exhibit #8
provided the court with clear and convincing evidence that on no less than five
occasions, Rodney used the property to secure loans by granting trust deeds to
various lenders with none or only some of the alleged joint tenant co-owners
participating in granting the trust deeds. When questioned about how he received a
loan against the land without all of the co-owner's endorsements, Rodney claimed
incredibly, that the loan had been secured by only !4 of the single parcel of land. (R.
390 Pg 105 Ln 1 - 19) See Addendum #4 with the five attached Trust Deeds which
demonstrate that:
On December 23, 1994, Rodney alone granted a trust deed to Pacific Rim
Financial Services.
On November 16, 1995, Rodney Sr., Rodney Jr., and Brittney Kaye Grgich
together granted a trust deed, but excluded Brenda Gowans.
On December 23, 1997, Rodney alone granted another trust deed to Pacific
Rim Financial Services.
On December 23, 1998, Rodney Sr., and Rodney Jr., together granted a trust
deed to Utah Mortgage Center but excluded Brittney Kaye Grgich and
Brenda Gowans.
On December 17, 1999, Rodney Sr., and Rodney Jr., together again granted a
trust deed to Utah Mortgage Center but excluded Brittney Kaye Grgich and
Brenda Gowans.
Even without the additional evidence provided by the five Trust Deeds or the
trial court's recognition that Rodney has always done what he wanted with the property,
that he was the only person who had control of this real property since 1989 and only he
had taken profits from the property (R. 284 - 283), Rodney's trial testimony that the
three children could have had the farm 'afterhe

were dead" was adequate clear

and convincing evidence for the trial court to determine that the 1990 Quitclaim
Deed was invalid because it clearly established that Rodney did not have the
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necessary present intent to transfer to the children any portion of his ownership and
control over the farm and divest himself of the same when he executed the deed
from himself to himself and the three children as joint tenants.
I I I . THE COURT DID NOT AWARD PROPERTY OF THIRD PARTIES
TO SHARON GRGICH
Rodney's third argument alleging the trial court awarded water rights belonging
to third parties to Sharon is not only an attempt to have a fourth bite at the apple by
bringing in another relative of Rodney's (Jerry Grgich) seeking once again to intervene
post-judgment, the argument is a complete scam.
Rodney cites to the record at (R. 319 - 355) to support his misrepresentation
that "[tjhese third parties have filed a motion to intervene and a motion for relief of
judgment," but he fails to tell anyone that his brief is presenting argument for his
brother Jerry Grgich, not himself and he certainly did not direct this Court's attention to
the portion of the record where his brother Jerry withdrew his Motion to Intervene and
Motion for Relief from Judgment on December 23, 2009. Because Rodney's brief was
drafted and submitted on April 12, 2010, several months after Jerry's withdrawal of his
Motions, there is no valid reason this misrepresentation should have occurred in
Rodney's brief.
IV.

THE DIVISION OF THE MARTIAL ESTATE WAS EQUITABLE
Rodney correctly states that to reverse the second trial courts' award of the

marital property, he has the burden of compiling every scrap of competent evidence
introduced during two trials which supports the property award and then, using that
evidence, he must convince this Court that the trial court abused its very broad
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discretion in making that property award to Sharon. Although in his brief, Rodney
cited to Stonehockerv. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, fl 29, 176 P.3d 476, in his unmarshaled argument to support his proposition that here, in the second court's
findings, a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion exists because Rodney was
assigned more debt that was Sharon, that argument completely ignores the very
detailed findings of the first trial court which gave a detailed analysis of existing case
law concerning property division and assigned specific values to all of the equipment
and martial debt. A summary of the several pages of findings concerning the division
of property, demonstrates that the first court addressed the lack of any alimony award
and Rodney's claim that the farm, water and equipment was his inheritance or was
conveyed to a Trust when it stated:
"The overreaching aim of a property division,..., is to achieve a fair, just, and equitable result
between the parties. Stated more specifically, the purpose of property divisions is to
allocate property in the manner which best serves the needs of the parties and best
permits them to pursue their separate lives." Noble v. Noble, (citations omitted).
"[I]n appropriate circumstances, a party may be awarded property which the other
spouse brought into the marriage. In fashioning an equitable property division, trial
courts must consider all of the pertinent circumstances, including the amount and kind
of property to be divided, the source of the property, the parties' health, the parties'
standard of living and respective financial conditions, their needs and earning capacities,
the duration of the marriage, what the parties gave up by the marriage, and the
relationship the property division has with the amount of alimony awarded." Naranjo v.
Naranjo, (citations omitted). In addition, a "wife is entitled to a fair and equitable share
of the financial benefits accumulated by virtue of the parties' joint efforts during the
marriage." Lee v. Lee, (citations omitted).
While living on the farm to fulfill Rodney's dream, Sharon was exposed to bestial
living conditions. The furnace in the parties' trailer home failed in 1993 and was
never repaired. The plumbing in the trailer is in disrepair and continues to deteriorate...
Neither party has been able to shower in the trailer for the last 5 years. The trailer's
electricity was disconnected 5 years ago and never reconnected. . .
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Since October 2006, Sharon has lived alone in this trailer with no utilities with the
exception of an extension cord plugged into a neighbor's socket. Sharon now showers
by filling a bucket with cold water, standing in a bathtub, and giving herself and
sponge bath. As well, she uses an ice chest for refrigeration and sustains herself with
cold sandwiches. ..
Besides these personal sacrifices, Sharon also supported this
farm through the direct efforts of her labor. . . There is no question that, throughout this
marriage, Sharon significantly participated in the workings of the farm.
Equally as clear, is the fact that Sharon was not compensated for her work as a
"farm hand" would be paid. . .This co-mingling is also apparent in the couple's tax
filings.. . At trial, there was no evidence produced or even alleged that the farms'
finances and parties' personal finances were EVER kept separate... (R 42 - 40)
When considering all "pertinent circumstances" including: the amount and kind of
property (land, water shares and farming equipment); the parties standard of living and
financial conditions (desperate for both parties); their needs; their earning capabilities
(little if any); the length of the marriage (close to 40 years); and what Sharon has given up
for this marriage (see above):
This Court finds it equitable that one-half of the interest and
ownership that Rodney had in the farm land, the associated
water rights, and farm equipment when Rodney inherited it
from his father in 1989 is granted to Sharon. (R. 39)
Apparently, Rodney did not like the outcome of the first trial, so he took a
second bite at the apple by having the three children intervene post-judgment thereby
directly causing the second trial concerning property distribution to occur. Apparently,
Rodney did not like the outcome of the second trial any better, so he took a third bite
at the apple by having his brother Jerry intervene again post-judgment to the second
judgment. However, as stated above, Jerry withdrew his Motion to Intervene. (R. 384)
Rodney then took his fourth bite at the apple by filing this appeal and therein
making his completely un-marshaled argument that the result of four years of litigation
should be reversed because Sharon was awarded a 1984 GMC pickup outside of the
order to sell the marital assets. Rodney's horrendous abuse of the court process, to
stall or deny for many months, Sharon's receipt of property in the manner which best
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serves the needs of the parties and best permits them to pursue their separate lives,
directly led the second trial court to award Sharon her attorney's fees.

V.

THERE WAS NO ERROR IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES
AGAINST THE PETITIONER
Rodney's condensed argument that "one must conclude" the trial court

awarded Sharon her fees based upon Utah Code Ann. §78B-27-825 implies he
cannot tell why the award was made or who is "subject to the Order"' awarding Sharon
her attorney's fees even though the court's decision clearly states the award was
made "because of petitioner's conduct in attempting to prevent her from receiving a
fair share of marital assets" (R. 280). Rodney has once again made just one citation
to the record rather than investing the time to marshal the evidence before the two trial
courts. Rodney's argument failed to mention no attorney's fees were awarded in the
original divorce decree.
Rodney's discussion of UCA §78B-27-825 in his brief may be interesting,
however, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(2) is the controlling statute and states in pertinent
part:
In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support,
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs
and attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed upon
the claim or defense.
When awarding fees under subsection (2), the court "may disregard the
financial need of the moving party." Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843, 850 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994); see also Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
("In an action to enforce the provisions of a divorce decree, an award of attorney fees
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is based solely upon the trial court's discretion, regardless of the financial need of the
moving party.")
The guiding factor in fee awards under subsection (2) is whether the party
seeking an award of fees substantially prevailed on the claim. Fee awards under
subsection (2) serve no equalizing function but allow the moving party to collect fees
unnecessarily incurred due to the other party's recalcitrance. See Finlayson, 874 P.2d
at 850-51.
In Tribe v. Tribe, 59 Utah 112, 202 P. 213 (1921), the Utah Supreme Court
discussed the rationale for awarding attorney fees when one party "refuses to comply
with the requirements of [an order or] decree" such that the other party "is compelled
to bring proceedings against" the offending party to ensure compliance with that order.
Id. at 216. The court explained that the trial court may award reasonable attorney
fees to the moving party so that he or she is not forced "to fritter away in costs and
counsel fees" the amounts received under the order "by bringing repeated actions to
enforce payment. . . ." Id.
Further, because Sharon's attorney submitted an affidavit to the trial court
describing in detail each of the legal services provided to her and billed at an hourly
rate which was well below the usual and customary fee for services of this type in this
location, and because Rodney never disputed the reasonableness of the fees nor
challenged the court's finding at the time the award was made so that the trial court
could address the concern at the trial court level, the trial court would have abused its
discretion in awarding less than the amount requested unless the reduction was
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warranted by one or more of the factors described in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764
P.2d 985, 987-91 (Utah 1988)
Rodney belatedly challenges the award of fees although once again, he
completely failed to marshal any of the legions of evidence available to the second
trial court concerning his conduct throughout the 33 months immediately preceding the
award, whereby he fully earned the right to pay his ex-wife's costs and attorney's fees.
Rodney asks the Court of Appeals to completely overlook an extensive record
that is heavily laden with incidents of his self-contradictory testimony and outright
refusal to testify on several issues. Rodney also failed to mention to this Court that by
his dishonest and evasive resistance to cooperation (when first sworn as a witness he
would not promise to tell truth) (R. 390 Pg 12 Ln 1 - 11) and numerous courtroom
outbursts during both trials, to include leaving the witness stand mid-way through his
examination (R. 390 Pg 63 Ln 5 -10), Rodney pushed the second trial court to the
point of the unusual action of having him handcuffed and taken into the holding cell
adjacent to the court room. (R. 277)
In this domestic case, Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(2) provided the authority for the
second trial court to award Sharon the costs and attorney fees she incurred upon
determining that she substantially prevailed upon her multiple claims of Rodney
refusing to obey the order of the court {(Sharon's Attorney fess reserved for trial
on January 24, 2007 (R. 23); Rodney's contempt for failing to pay her Y2 of farm
income certified and attorney's fees reserved for trial, July 7, 2008 (R. 211)} and her
claim concerning the second division of property as stated by the second trial court:
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"This Order was entered, because in the original divorce real property was awarded which
had been titled in part in the names of the interveners and they were not then parties to the
action." (R. 286)
Finally, Rodney's "defense asserted in good faith" argument falls to its quick
and ugly death once the Court reviews Rodney's still ongoing shill game to delay and
deny Sharon any chance to escape her bestial living conditions, such as his initial
claims of all of the martial property belonging to an "irrevocable trust" during the first
trial, followed by his claim that the "irrevocable trust" had been revoked just prior to the
second day of the second trial, (R. 276) or the entire second trial which had been
precipitated by his children's claims of inadequate notice, even though Rodney's
oldest daughter Brenda Gowans attended and even testified at the first trial on
November 15, 2007. (R.404 Pg 155 - 175) Another example of Rodney's deny and
delay tactics occurred when on February 4, 2008 (R. 60 U#3) Rodney filed his
objection to the first Findings wherein he claimed some of the water belonged to his
brother (Jerry Grgich) and yet 21 months later, on November 5, 2009, after the second
judgment had been entered, Rodney's brother Jerry appeared, claiming that he must
be allowed to intervene and moved the trial court to set aside the judgment because of
lack of notice to him. (R. 355)
Sharon's position is the award of fees was properly made by the trial court to
allow her, as the prevailing party to collect fees unnecessarily incurred due to
Rodney's recalcitrance and his dishonest and evasive conduct. (R. 277)
The award of fees was based on adequate and detailed evidence which
Rodney never disputed nor challenged at the trial court level and his challenge made
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to this Court was not supported by any credible evidence, thus the award of attorney's
fees by the trial court should stand as entered.
Request for Costs and Attorney's Fees Upon Appeal
In divorce actions where the trial court has awarded attorney fees and the
receiving spouse [prevails] on the main issues, we generally award fees on appeal."
(quoting Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83, H 43, 45 P.3d 176), Stonehocker v.
Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, U 11, 176 P.3d 476 (alteration in original) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
Rodney's dishonest and evasive actions in court during two trials, his multiple
incidents of contempt, his continuous stalling tactics and now his decisively
inadequate appellate brief have all combined to cause Sharon to remain living, for
more than four years, in horrendous conditions that should be completely
unimaginable in the State of Utah while he has enjoyed living with all of the modern
utilities during the many months it has already taken and will continue to take for him
to receive his fourth bite at this apple.
This appeal was not well taken for good cause and has directly caused Sharon
to accumulate additional attorney's fees and costs that exceed the fees she was
forced to incur in the trial court. Therefore, Sharon hereby explicitly and respectfully
requests that she be allowed to recover the attorney's fees incurred on appeal out of
Rodney's share of the proceeds from the previously ordered sale of the marital assets
and/or immediately from the interveners in an amount to be determined by the court.
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CONCLUSION
The appellant's dishonest and evasive actions in court during two trials, his
multiple incidents of contempt, his continuous stalling tactics and now his decisively
inadequate appellate brief have all combined to cause his ex-wife of 40 years a great
injustice.
Rodney, through the deceit of his children, demanded a second trial on the
issue of the division of marital property and then used his brother to demand a third
trial. Once that demand was withdrawn from the trial court, he filed his appellant's
brief in this Court, in which he completely failed to marshal the evidence as required
by the Rules of Appellate Procedure and apparently intentionally misrepresented the
status of his third issue on appeal.
The response to Rodney's appeal required of Sharon has caused her to incur
substantial additional attorney's fees in addition to those properly awarded to her by
the second trial court. She has prevailed on the issues presented to the first trial
court. She has prevailed on the issues presented to the second trial court, and
assuming with good cause that she will prevail on this appeal, Sharon has asked this
Court to award her the fees she has incurred herein.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED ON THIS January 12, 2011.

A&—
Gary Butiler
Attorney for Sharon Grgich, Appellee
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I hereby certify that on this

day of January, 2011,1 served 2 copies and

a PDF disk of the forgoing document, by depositing a true and correct copy thereof in
the United States Mails, addressed to:
Scott A. Broadhead
P.O. Box 1141
Tooele Utah 84074
(jary Buhler
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Addendum #1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RODNEY FRANK GRGICH,

AMENDED MEMORANDUM
DECISION
(BENCH TRIAL)

Petitioner,
vs.
SHARON GRGICH,

CASE NO. 064300444

Respondent.

Judge Mark S. Kouris

This Court tried the above captioned matter on 15 November 2007.
Petitioner, Rodney Frank Grgich ("Rodney"), was represented by Mr.
Scott A. Broadhead.

Respondent, Sharon Grgich ("Sharon"), was

represented by Mr. Gary Buhler.
This Court evaluated the sworn Financial
parties,

reviewed

all

other

written

Declarations of the

documentation

and

received

testimony.
This Court Amends the original Memorandum Decision because of an
arithmetic error in the distribution of personal assets and debts.
This decision reflects the these corrections.
Background
The parties married in May 1967 in Elko, Nevada.

They purchased

a trailer home and lived on Rodney's father's farm ("the farm").

Then,

starting in 1977, they lived for a time in Tooele, Terra and Dugway,
Utah.

Facing continuing financial difficulties, they lost many houses

1

through repossession or eviction.

In 1993, they moved back to the

trailer on the farm.
At the time of the parties1 marriage, Rodney worked at the
Tooele Smelter and in 1968 began working at the Tooele Army Depot. In
1993, he retired to focus his efforts on his farming. In 1999, he also
began driving part-time for Capital Roofing, but was forced to quit
because of a heart condition.

Since the fall of 2006, Rodney has

lived in a modern trailer complete with fully operating utilities.

Due

to his heart condition, Rodney currently does not work but earns
$215.00 per month from social security and one-half of his federal
retirement, which is $445.00, which equals $660.00 per month. The
parties1 children pay Rodney's rent and supplement his income each
month so he can cover his expenses.
At the time of the marriage, Sharon occasionally worked outside
the home.

Upon the birth of the first of the parties' five children,

Sharon quit her job and became a full-time mother. While raising the
couple's children, she spent a considerable amount of time working on
the farm (discussed in detail below). Sharon currently lives in the
parties original trailer and works at Macy's food store where she earns
$770.00 per month plus one-half of Rodney's federal retirement'
($445.00) which equals $1,215.00 per month.
1 This entire retirement account accrued during the parties' marriage
and will therefore continue be divided equally between the parties.
In 1989, Rodney's father reposed. Rodney's father willed the 26.8
acre farm, the associated water rights, and the farm equipment to Rodney.
In January 1990, Rodney received the actual deed willing him the

2

mentioned items.

Rodney immediately executed a quick-claim deed

transferring whatever ownership interest he had at that time over to
three of his children.

Rodney testified that perceived favorable

property tax and inheritance tax treatment were his only motivation for
the transfer.

Sharon's name has never been on the deeds of ownership

for the land, water shares or farm equipment.
With this background in place, this Court was asked to determine
alimony and to equitably split the parties1 assets.

During the course

of trial, both attorneys conceded that, when considering Sharon's
financial needs and her ability to earn, Sharon is unable to fulfill
her monthly financial obligations.

However, given that Rodney requires

a monthly financial infusion by the parties1 children, he is unable to
help provide support for Sharon.

Based upon these concessions and

facts proven at trial, the issue of alimony is not be considered.
This Court will, however, address the issue of splitting the
parties' assets. Therefore, this Court makes the following Findings and
Conclusions:
DIVISION OF PROPERTY
"The overreaching aim of a property division, ... , is to achieve a
fair, just, and equitable result between the parties.

Stated more

specifically, the purpose of property divisions is to allocate
property in the manner which best serves the needs of the parties and
best permits them to pursue their separate lives." Noble v. Noble,

761

P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted).
In the case at hand, Rodney contends that he inherited the farm
land, water rights, and farm equipment. He therefore asserts that

3

Sharon has no claim to any of this property. "[A]s a general rule,
property acquired by one spouse by gift and inheritance during the
marriage [should be awarded] to that spouse, together with any
appreciation or enhancement of its value." Bradford
P.2d 887, 892-893

v. Bradford,

993

(Utah Ct. App. 1999) (citations omitted) . However,

the trial court should not "consider[] the property division in a
vacuum." Noble v.

Noble,

761'P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988) (citations

omitted).
"[I]n appropriate circumstances, a party may be awarded property
which the other spouse brought into the marriage.

In fashioning an

equitable property division, trial courts must consider all of the
pertinent circumstances, including the amount and kind of property to
be divided, the source of the property, the parties' health, the
parties1 standard of living and respective financial conditions, their
needs and earning capacities, the duration of the marriage, what the
parties gave up by the marriage, and the relationship the property
division has with the amount of alimony awarded." Naranjo

v.

Naranjo,

751 P.2d 1144, 1147-1148 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citations omitted).

In

addition, a "wife is entitled to a fair and equitable share of the
financial benefits accumulated by virtue of the parties1 joint efforts
during the marriage." Lee

v.

Lee,

744 P.2d 1378, 1379 (Utah Ct. App.

1987) (awarding wife equitable share of corporation reasoning that
wife assumed clerical duties in the business, she reared the parties1
two children, and performed domestic duties, allowing husband to
participate full time in the business).

4

In the case at hand, Sharon and Rodney both testified to Rodney's
desire to be on the farm (despite the farm's meager earnings). Sharon
stated that Rodney "bled brown" due to his love for farming.
While living on the farm to fulfill Rodney's dream, Sharon was
exposed to bestial living

conditions.

The furnace in the parties'

trailer home failed in 1993 and was never repaired.

The plumbing in

the trailer is in disrepair and continues to deteriorate.
water available in the kitchen.

There is no

The water continuously leaked around

the base of the water heater, ultimately causing the water heater to
fall through the floor.

Water also rotted the bottom of the stove,

causing Sharon to disconnect it for safety sake.

Neither party has

been able to shower in the trailer for the last 5 years.

The

trailer's electricity was disconnected 5 years ago and never
reconnected.
During this time, any money the parties had that could be used
to fix these primitive living conditions, was used to service the farm.
For example, recently the parties had saved $1,200.00 to reconnect
the electricity.

At that same time the hay liner (hay bail wagon)

was not working.

Despite the upcoming winter, the parties decided to

forego the electricity and repair the hay liner.

All the while,

the parties continued to live without heat, running water and
electricity. Curiously, the parties somehow found the money to feed
the livestock, buy seed potatoes and other seeds and to continually
repair the aging farm equipment.
Since October 2006, Sharon has lived alone in this trailer with
no utilities with the exception of an extension cord plugged into a
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neighbor's socket.

Sharon now showers by filling a bucket with cold

water, standing in a bathtub, and giving herself and sponge bath.

As

well, she uses an ice chest for refrigeration and sustains herself
with cold sandwiches.
Besides these personal sacrifices, Sharon also supported this
farm through the direct efforts of her labor.

At trial, Rodney

attempted to minimize Sharon's work effort, but oft times he
contradicted his own deposition statements on the same subject.

The

parties' offspring also dwarfed Sharon's work effort on the farm.
However, cross examination quickly revealed that the parties' children
have aligned themselves with Rodney in this matter and will reap
financial benefits if Rodney prevails.

For these reasons, this Court

finds Rodney and his children's statements lack credibility.
Alternatively, Sharon indicated that she started working on the
farm in 1967 when the couple was married.

She would help change

sprinkler lines and pulled the hay wagons with the tractors.

Sharon

then moved on to routinely assist in digging the potato crops, feeding
the cows, hauling and spreading manure, bailing hay, helping to
gather the barley, driving the grain trucks to Ogden, Utah and
delivering dead animals to the dump.

Sharon was also the designated

"gopher," being called upon at any time to run for supplies ranging
from fuel to bailing wire to tractor parts. Also, since the time of
the parties' marriage, Sharon has handled all of the parties'
financial matters.
This responsibility broadened to include the farm's finances
after Rodney's father died in 1989. Despite all of the farm related

6

responsibilities, Sharon was also the primary caregiver to the
parties1 five children.
There is no question that, throughout this marriage, Sharon
significantly participated in the workings of the farm. Equally as
clear, is the fact that Sharon was not compensated for her work as a
"farm hand" would be paid.

Instead, Sharon and Rodney received

compensation similar to that of any business owner.

The profits or

losses were co-mingled into the couple's personal household finances.
This co-mingling is also apparent in the couple's tax filings.
Sharon testified that every year since the death of Rodney's father
(1989), Rodney combined the farm and personal household tax returns.
The Court received the parties1 2005 and 2006 tax returns into
evidence.
return.

In 2005, the parties filed a "married filing jointly" tax
Included in this joint filing is a Schedule F —

Loss From Farming.

The filing also included a Form 4136 —

Profit or
Credit for

Federal Tax Paid on Fuel. This form allows a credit for diesel fuel
and kerosene used on a farm for farming purposes.
Sharonfs name appear on the top of this

form.

Both, Rodney and
Finally, the tax

filing includes a Form 4562 - Schedule of Depreciation and
Amortization.

The section titled "Business or activity to which this

form relates," reads "Livestock-Hay-Grain-Potatoes."
The 2006 tax return is also a combined form, including personal
and farming schedules and forms.

However, Rodney filed this form

after the parties had separated and Rodney had received a Protective
Order against Sharon.

Based upon this circumstance, Rodney filed the

2006 return as "married filing separately."

7

At trial, there was no evidence produced or even alleged that
the farms1 finances and parties' personal finances were EVER kept
separate.

Further, since 1989, the farm's and parties1 tax returns

were NEVER filed separately.
When considering all "pertinent circumstances" including: the
amount and kind of property (land, water shares and farming equipment);
the parties standard of living and financial conditions (desperate for
both parties); their needs; their earning capabilities (little if any);
the length of the marriage (close to 40 years); and what Sharon has
given up for this marriage (see above):
This Court finds it equitable that one-half of
the interest and ownership that Rodney had in
the farm land, the associated water rights, and
farm equipment2 when Rodney inherited it from
his father in 1989 is granted to Sharon.

2
This inherited
value follows:

farm

equipment

1070 Case Tractor

$5,500.00

Manure Spreader

$ 500.00

995 Case Tractor

$5,995.00

2 - 466 J o h n

$1,000.00

Deere bailer

20 hole M.M. grain drill

$ 100.00

Swedish Harrow

$ 600.00

Ford Field Cultivator

$ 350.00

Rolling Mill

$1,000.00

13-6 wheel disk (double)

$

Potato Planter (international)

$ 150.00

Potato Digger

$ 400.00

Flair Beater

$ 50.00

600.00

8

and

its

corresponding

$ 200.00

Bale Elevator
6" Grain

$ 125.00

Elevator

1033

New Holland Stack Wagon

$5,000.00

Wheel

Type Sprinklers

$3,500.00

1974
Total

70" Howard Rotivator

$3,000.00
$8,070.00

Value

Further, at trial some evidence was produced alleging
that the farm, water rights and farm equipment has been
subsequently transferred into a trust and are therefore
inaccessible for property distribution by this Court. In
fact, NO documents were entered into evidence verifying the
existence of this trust.

This trust is not recorded by the

appropriate county recorder or any other governmental
entity against these assets.

Finally, the trial unearthed

many facts that question the motivation and legitimacy of
the alleged trust.

These irregularities include:

transferring tractors into the names of children who were
nine, five and one year(s) old at the time of the transfer;
transferring livestock into the trust three months prior to
filing for divorce without an accompanying required "brand
inspection" or any other legal indicia of a transfer; and
Rodney's transferring all of his assets into the trust
without compensation and without retaining sufficient
assets to satisfy his outstanding obligations.

Therefore,

this Court also finds:
There is no legal basis for the alleged
trust discussed in trial, therefore
this Court has the ability to equitably
divide said assets.
9

Further, based upon equity and consistent with t h i s Court's
findings above, the remaining personal, property i s divided as
follows:
Property

Granted

1973 Ford F250
197 6 GMC

$

to Sharon
300.00

Property

Granted

to

Rodney
$

100.00

$

1,000.00

$

150.00

64 0 John Deere Rake

$

200.00

1994 Befco 12 Wheel Rake

$

2,000.00

S 1976 Massie Fergusson Combine

$

6,500.00

6 Potato Cutter

$

75.00

M 1952 I.H. Farmal Tractor

$

1,000.00

M 1984 GMC 4x4

$

3,000.00

M 1982 Volkswagon Pick-up

$

200.00

M 1991 Geo Metro

$

325.00

6 1956 John Deere Tractor

$

1,500.00

it

1988 12' Mower Conditioner

$

7,500.00

1988 200 gal. Century sprayer

$

600.00

2 set of Horrows

$

400.00

John Deere 2 row planter

$

300.00

Massie Ferguson 2 way plow

$

800.00

Total Assets

$25,650.00

M 1954 BF M.M. Tractor
1961 Chevrolet Dump Truck

$1,700.00

H Mower E-10 Case

JTotal Assets

$2,000.00

The debts are assigned as follows:
Debt Assigned

to Sharon

Express Recovery $2490.00
Francis Flores $1,900.00

Debt Assigned

to

Rodney

Rodney's Medical Bill
Utah Mortgage

3

Omnium Worldwide
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$ 12,599.00
$ 14,275.00
$

109.00

Total Debt

$ 4,390.00

ERS Solutions

$

89.00

American Debt Col.

$

914.00

Tooele County

$

378.00

Farm Land Prop Tax

$

2,120.00

Total Debt

$30,444.00

3
This represents one-half of the loan taken on the farm by
Rodney and his brother (his brother assumes responsibility for the
other one-half of the loan) .

The debt associated with Alyssa's (the parties1
granddaughter) Medical debt occurred after the separation of
the parties. This debt is therefore not marital property and
will not be assigned. Similarly, the debts associated with Mr.
Elwood Buxton ($48,000) and Mr. Rocky Russell ($19,000) are not
assigned.

At trial, the parties indicated that these debts are

dormant and neither party anticipates further legal action to
prove or collect the alleged outstanding debts.
Each party will be responsible for its own attorney's fees.
Mr. Buhler is ordered to prepare Findings and a Decree
consistent with this Ruling.

Dated this

(;CT*~ day of/(fail
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REAL PROPERTY
icription

Value"

How acquired

il Property:
interest in farm at 4311 No. Cochrane

$250,000.00

Inherited from Rodney's father

WATER RIG

15-4816
15-4817
15-4818
15-4819
15-4820
15-4821
15-1267
15-1400
15-1395
15-1394
15-1091
15-1124

Acre ft.

How acquired

52.48
6.115
6.115
7.98,
8.274
21.00
16.52
6.60
2.814
2.52
2.405
1.995

Inherited
Inherited
Inherited
Inherited
Inherited
Inherited
Inherited
Inherited
Inherited
Inherited
Inherited
Inherited

Owners
Grgich, Rodney F. & Brenda & Rodney Jr. & Brittney
Grgich, Rodney F. & Brenda & Rodney Jr. & Brittney
Grgich, Rodney F. & Brenda & Rodney Jr. & Brittney
Grgich, Rodney F. & Brenda & Rodney Jr. & Brittney
Grgich, Rodney F. & Brenda & Rodney Jr. & Brittney
JSsgich, Rodney F. & Brenda & Rodney Jr. & Brittney
Grgich, Rodney F. & Jerry & Marlin & Sidney
Grgich, Rodney F. & Jerry & Marlin & Sidney
Grgich, Rodney F. & Jerry & Marlin & Sidney
Grgich, Rodney F. & Jerry & Marlin & Sidney
Grgich, Rodney F. & Jerry & Marlin & Sidney
Grgich, Rodney F. & Jerry & Marlin & Sidney

(K*

0, \1H A* ^

VM

?

if

fr

0^

RODNEY'S INCOME
-Source

Amount

Total
Total

$22,003.80
$534.75
$13,377.00
$3,004.00
$39,319.55

$40,000.00 approx.
(Rodney does not have tax return. He believes was about the
same andfromthe same sources)
$2,100.32

2006

$112.34
$13,440.00
$1,280.00
5,564.00
$3,517.00
$26,013.66

K-

Capitol Roofing _
^ ^
U.S. Dept of Agriculture ,
Federal retirement yFarming

Capitol Roofing

^K

U.S. Dept of Agriculture
Federal retirement
y
in life insurance
- Cashed
Cashed in life insurance
Farming
Federal Retirement
Social Security

2007 £ < > > / /

$890.00 per month

2008

$215.00 per month
$890.00 per month ?
$215.00 per month?

Federal Retirement
Social Security

$1056.00
$256.00

Federal Retirement
Social Security

2009

^

P"'

'[^K\

JHr(
i^Lx

ao^^

^

v ^ ^

- V*.'

p-

p

chicles:

yK

76 GMC 3/4 ton C^~^
82 Volkswagen pickup jv*> *-v"-»/
91 Geo Metro
]jsi\

VF^

????
$100.00
$100.00

Gift
v
v^6T£>^
Purchased for $1,400.00 j l / ^ l
«L/Uft*~"
Purchased
(vr6^1^
"~

c^R^p^

&v*C

•ailers:
67 Columbia 12x51

$0.00

Purchased for $4,700.00 ^ A S K ^

71 Fleetwood

$1,200.00

Gift

>ws:
der cows-(15 @ $300.00)

$4,500.00

ill - (1 @ $800.00)
der Calves - (4 @ 250.00)
nmger calves - (5 @ $100.00)

$800.00
$1,000.00
$500.00

<%~O^M0

it - ^ Y U >
Older than 3 months
Under 3 months

$o J <5
\P^

O

»e^
C6 c >

\ JUv

^W^

s-half of herd is owned by Rodney's brother. Rodney inherited from father 9 cows, 6-7 calves and "l/2mterest in bull.

Description of Item-Troy Gowans
1 [1977 Case Model 995 Tractor-P/S pusing oil into engine
Hydraulic for remote needs new kit- SN 995A11071013
.Century Sprayer - PTO, 30' wand, 200 gallon tank
1976 MF 760 Combine, 24' header - SN 174603982
1988 7' harrows, 2 sections
Case Trail behind 7' mower, sickle bar
6120" Speed King Grain Elevator
1961 Chev. MDL 60 Dump Truck w/14' Bed - Stock Sides
5+2 transmission, very worn rubber
8 Gehl 60 bushel roller feed mill mixer
24' Hay elevator
Farmall H Tractor, 20% rubber
987 Case Mdl 1490 Swather, 12 foot header, SN 101684
John Deere 466 Wire Type Baler, SN 261062E
3])Gopher Poison Machine, Pull type
John Deere Model 640 10' rake, SN 214870E, needs 3 new tires
^
gear box loose
^?5^Case 1210 Tractor, Power Steering crack, 40% rubber, SN 12101151923
Needs new tires (No picture on this tractor)
floline 20 hole grain drill w/grass seeded
John Deere 466 baler (parts only)
assey Ferguson 2 row potatoe digge r- No Serial number
ff§]|Massey Ferguson Model 57 3 bottom rollover plow
20|Eversman Model 7, 13-6 wheel disk (Double) SN 12414
21 |Home built spring harrows w/gauge wheels, 13-6
221 Acme 2-6' harrows
23j John Deere Model 71 two row corn planter
24|Case Model 1070 Tractor, needs new transmission, 0% rubber
1976 International Loadstar 1600, 5+2 transmission
14' Hoist, VIN D052FHB14432
2611974 Howard rotovator, 7' wide, Model E70
27|McCormick Model 2 row potatoe planter w/fertilizer tanks
2811956 John Deere Model 60 Tractor (No S/N)
Clutch has seal leak, needs new gaskets, needs new rubber
1994 Befco 12 wheel rake, S/N 156497
Home buit 3 point-3 row cultivator
John Deere 2 row cultivator, S/N0007
31 1973 Ford Truck
32 7' vine beater

Item

£

Condition

| Mileage/hrs. | Quanity |

Price

|

Fair
Fair
Fair
Fair
Fair
Poor

1557 hrs.
N/A
No Meter
N/A
N/A
N/A

$6,000.00
$350.00
$4,500.00
$180.00
$350.00
$25.00

Poor
Fair
Fair
Poor
Fair
Fair
Fair

over 100,000
N/A
N/A
No meter
N/A
N/A
N/A

$750.00
$350.00
$50.00
$850.00
$1,500.00
$1,800.00
$150.00

Poor
Fair
Poor
Fair
Parts
Fair
Fair
Fair
Fair
Fair

N/A
No Meter
No Meter
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

Poor/Salvage

4^71 hrs.

Fair
Fair

113,979
N/A
N/A

Fair
Poor
Fair

No Meter
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

i/A

Value

V

$6,000.001
$350. OQL^$4,500.00
$360.00
$350.00 CV^
$25.00

£

$750.00
J350.00
$50.00
$85O0OV^

$1,500.00<LZ^
$1,800.00
$150.00

g>

$175.00

$175.001^

$3^500.00
$250.00
$100.00
$200.00
$350.00
$1,100.00
$500.00
$150.00
$100.00
$1,500.00

$3,500.0Qf^
$250.00
$100.00
$200.00
$350.00
$1,100.004$500.00f-—
$300.00
$100.00
$1,500.004—•

$750.00
$500.00
$250.00

$750.00
$500.0Oh—
$250.00

$850.00
$2,000.00
$150.00
$150.00
$100.00
$25.00

$856.004—"
$2,000.00
$150.00
$150.00
$100.00
$25.00

Item
33
34
35
36
37
38

Description of Item-Troy Gowans
Minneapolis Moline Tractor (Stored in shed)
Seed Cutter
Wood side manure spreader (no pitches)
1973 Ford Model 117 7'-9 shank field cultivator
Home built hang-on V ditcher
1984 GMC Sierra 1500, 4x4 Truck, VINGTEK14H8EJ501494
39 1966 Chev. K10 Pickup, 6 cyl., no brakes, rusted out
40 Allumack 1/4 miles of 4" wheel line, bent up wheels

TOTAL

Lynn E. Livingston, Appraiser

Date:

I

Condition
Salvage
Salvage
Poor
Fair
Fair
Fair
Poor
Fair

| Mileage/hrs. | Quanity | Price |
Value
N/A
$100.00
$100.00
N/A
$20.00^
$20.00
N/A
$150.00
$150.00
N/A
$250.00
$250.001^
$75.00
N/A
$75.0oT
Over 100,000
$500.00
$500.00 V/
$100.00
$100.00
N/A
$1,200.00 $1,200.00
N/A

$32,280.00

DEBTS

f¥^5

rediterooele County Treasurer

-Ameunt2000

Purpose
Property taxes on farm land

tah Mortgage
Iwood Buxton
SUBTOTAL

28550.25
20000
50550.25

Mortgage on farm land by Rodney and Rodney Jr.
Judgment lien on farm land

fountain Medical

11.06

Rodney's medical bill

fountain West Radiology
DS Hospital
DS Hospital
tah Heart Clinic
IC
fountain West Family Practice
an Flint
imont Hanley & Assoc.
fountain West Medical
•ofessional Acct. Services
nited Recovery Group
fountain West Anesthesia
Ita View Hospital
SUBTOTAL

22.41
865.5
6634.89
137.28
3786.94
19.42
7.84
17.55
169.9
20.77
3 93.5 5
368.06
98.03
12559.2

Rodney's medical bill
Rodney's medical bill
Rodney's medical bill ( from assault by Sharon)
Rodney's medical bill
Rodney's medical bill
-10&
^
Rodney's medical bill
^A
Rodney's medical bill ^ l
v ^yU\ V
o
Rodney's medical bill
\P
Rodney's medical bill &
Rodney's medical bill
Rodney's medical bill
Rodney's medical bill
Rodney's medical bill

tah Pathology Services

100.85

Alyssa's medical bill

Doele Valley Urgent Care
fountain West Medical
IC Medical Group
Doele Foot & Ankle Clinic
SUBTOTAL

40.98
104.4
-fC,
316
70 ^ ^
632.23

Alyssa's medical bill
Alyssa's medical bill
Alyssa's medical bill
Alyssa's medical bill

>cpress Recovery Services

2490.11

Collection account . f i ^ L f * * * ^ • p<^vT^

rnnium Worldwide Inc.
109.14
aoele County
Q3&6T
•ancisFlores
1900
RS Solutions
89.91
C
merican Debt Collection C - <• 914.17
ocky Russell
_19000
SUBTOTAL
24881.96
TOTAL

I

p

^

jT

\H

fi> f

^

"\

\

(A^

Collection account - telephone bill
Waste-drspusal f>Mp
Personal loan from Francis to Sharon fi^
Collection account - telephone bill
Collection account
\ ^P^L
0
Judgment
Cc Y \° ~^
f^-

116,744.5

&*

PifcNa.

FCTWII 9ftR

TITLE ABSTRACT SHEET FOR WATER RIGHT NO.
Total Amount in Right (AC.-FL, Uses, &/or CFS):
NOTICE:

^3.

s<5

¥ *c**S

*~ //gV

/^<*^ts*U>t<?ks J

No agency of the Slate of Uiah warrants or guarantees title to certain water rights. The State Engineer's Office serves
only as an office of public record. The water right information provided here reflects that which has beenfiledwith the
State Engineer's Office by the public. If an opinion of title assurance is desired, an attorney or other qualified professional should be retained.

Quitclaim Deed_
Warranty Deed_
Assignment^
Decree (Court Name and Case No.): Distribution (Probate)^
Bankruptcy
Divorce
Adjudication^
Quiet Tille
Death Certification (If Joint Tcnant)_
Other
Date Recorded.
Date Signed_^/_-/ ^ V / *?Q
Title Work Processed By
Date R c c ' d _ 4 L /
2 -/ 7 ^
By
fajf N
\ Database Changed.
File Changed $ / & I &0
isy ,y r'U*
Grantor
/VW^ ^
/r^^y^^/f
('&*Z/6LJ2 )
(iranlec(s)
mm

tr

ir

Sheriff's Deed

Recorder's #

&£2

//£*

By.
Amount Retained

-"tT

Amount Received e>?.<^.

^

ty

**cs

Address
Mailing Address (If Dtffercm)_
Remarks
Quitclaim Deed
Sheriff* Deed
Warranty Deed_
Assignment_
Decree (Court Name and Case No.): Distribution (Probate)_
Bankruptcy__
Divorce
Quiet Title
Adjudication^
Death Certification (If Joint Tenant)^
Other
Date Signed / / J?5l
<?Q
Date Recorded^
Recorder'i«
£>3J~
/J */
Dale Rec'd * S /
£_ I #0
Title Work Processed
sewed By / f f /
File Changed/^ /
y j ~
By /Ujf"
DmbMe Chanted & I fT* l"f<?
> ^ ^ j y r /
Amount Retained
_
Grantor -,-X%r f rj ^* W w ,
Granlcc(<
V
X
r-..---—
>"~
?
~ J
f
Amount Reived « ^ # ^arc*?S

2B

Ad*e»

s*.3 *i**A6 /*ffJr</.

Mailing Address (If Different)
Remarks

-7Z~Jl> ^ T

Assignment^
Warranty Deed_
Decree (Court Name and Case No.): Distribution (Probate)^

Quitclaim Deed

Divorce

Bankruptcy__
Adjudication^

Quiet Title
Death Certification (If Joint Tenant)^
Date Signed
/
/
Date Rcc'd
I
/
File Changed
/__
./Grantor
Orantcofs)

rV/!7/J~

_

Other
Date Recorded.
J.
.L
Title Work Processed By
By
Database Changed.

Sheriff s Deed

Recorder's #
By.
Amount Retained
Amount Received

Address
Mailing Address Of Different)
Remarks

"THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT IF NOT UNDERSTOOD, SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE "

Recorded at Request of
at

M Fee Paid $_

by.

Dep Boole

Page.

Ref ...

Address.

Mail tax notice to_

QMt-OIiHait Btth
RODNEY FRANK GRGICH
, grantor,
of
Tooele
, Countyof T o o e l e
.State of Utah, hereby
QUIT-CLAIM to RODNEY FRANK GRGICH, BRENDA ICATHLEEN GRGICH, RODNEY
GRGICH, J R . , BRITTNEY KAYE GRGICH a s j o i n t t e n a n t s w i t h f u l l
rights
, grantee,
o f s u r v i v o r s h i p and n o t a s t e n a n t s m common
of
Tooele County, Utah
for the sum of
• - - TEN a n d n q / 1 0 0
DOLLARS,
, a n d o t h e r s o)0,d
o n and,
and v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n
the following aescrfbecrtract oTIand in
TO O e 1 e
^ounty,
State of Utah

SEE DESCRIPTION ATTACHED

J??

BQOr,.

0 3 2 12 4

vJrUi

p.--r,F &0- =57/

I i

ic.

V U

co»'W s i^rtTKivC
DEPUTY

WITNESS the hand of said grantor , this
January
, A.D , one thousand nine hundred and N i n e t y .
Signed in the presence of

day of

RODNEY FRAM G E ^ I C S ^ O /

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTYOF
On the 25th

ss

TOOELE

day of
January
RODNEY FRANK GRGICH

,19 9 0 , personally appeared before me
, the signer of the within instrument, who

duly

acto(

the same

^T"!jn[^^

I *i

EXHIBIT

I

midu

HJddjiu.

4

Beginning 10 chains East of the Northwest corner of
the Northeast quarter of Section 32, T2S, R4W; East
23.30 chains, South 12.14 chains, West 23.30 chains
North-, 12.14 chains to the beginning; contajLning
2§ .83 .acres jnore or less; after excluding the one (1)
acre deeded to~Marfin Grgich, described as follows:
Beginning on the West line of Cochrane Lane
at a point North 89 37'02" East 2156.29 feet along
Section line and South 0 20,48,, East 801.23 feet
from the North 1/4 corner Section 32, Township
2 South; Range 4 West, SLB & M; thence running
North 89 37'02" West 541.8 feet; thence North
0 20'48" West 72.0 feet; thence North 89 37'02" East
344.8 feet; thence South 0 20!48" East 41.3 feet;
thence North 89 37'02" East 72.0 feet; thence North
0 20f48" West 101.8 feet; thence North 89 37'02" East
125.0 feet to Cochrane Lane; thence South 0 20'48"
East 132.5 feet to beginning, Erda, Tooele County,
State of Utah* Containing 1.0 acres, with all
improvements and appurtenances.

^ D P ^ D ^ * *1
Created 2/5/2007 4:40 PM
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Parcel Abstract
This abstract is complete as of 1/29/2007 11:50:43 AM Except Water / Mineral Documents

Parcel number 05-048-0-0008
Effective 1/1/1996, 26.830 acres
BEG 660 FT E OF NW COR OF NE 1
Grantors

Grantees

Instrument Type
& Consideration

Instrument
Date

Entry #
Filing Date & Affected
Documents
Book/Page Time

BUHLERGARY

Grgich sharon

ATTORNEY'S
LIEN
$0.00

1/20/2007

276405
0/66357

1/22/2007
10:11 AM

GRGICH
SHARON
RESPONDENT

Grgich rodney
frank petitioner

LIS PENDENS
$0.00

1/20/2007

276404
0/66355

1/22/2007
10:11 AM

12/20/2006

275222
0/61898

1/2/2007
2:11 PM

9/21/2005

251501
0/0

12/12/2005
2:35 PM

GRGICH
RODNEY
FRANK
PETITIONER

Grgjch

sharon

respondent

j^CASE #064300444 DA (1/23/2007 8:19:00 AM)
BUHLERGARY

Grgich sharon

ATTORNEY'S
LIEN
$0.00

^NOTICE OF ATTORNEY'S LIEN (1/2/2007 4:45:00 PM) _
Utah Mortgage
Center

Steve Goorman ASSGN OF
Revocable Trust TRUST DEED
$0.00

141420/602/4
29

OfficialDocument Note - General - TRUST DEED (0602/0429) (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM)
^OfficialDocument Note - General - ASSGN OF TRUST DEED (0000/0000) (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM)
Jensen Ivan O
Utah Mortgage
Trustee 35% int Center

ASSGN OF
TRUST DEED

Jensen
Marguerite C
Trustee

$0

9/21/2005

251500
0/0

141420/602/4
29

12/12/2005
2:35 PM

-00

Pollett R Alva
Trustee 65% Int
Pollett E Trustee
General - NOTARY DOES NOT MATCH GRANTOR CLAUS (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM)
OfficialDocument Note - General - TRUST DEED (0602/0429) (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM)
OfficialDocument Note - General - ASSGN OF TRUST DEED (0000/0000) (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM)
Parry Edwin B

Grgich Rodney
Frank
Grgich Rodney
Jr

^eHerll

NOTICE OF
DEFAULT
$0.00

10/21/2003

213860
904/589

11/14/2003
12:02 PM

1/9/2003

194203
814/280

1/14/2003
11:34 AM

L.69?/4^9Jll1420J6/9/2iOO£7:42:00 PM)_

Parry Edwin B

Grgich Rodney
Frank
Grgich Rodney
Jr

NOTICE OF
DEFAULT
$0.00

i

kr> Ll_/

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

2 of 5

Created 2/5/2007 4:40 PM

Parcel Abstract
General - 602/429 141420 (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM)

Parry Edwin B

PUBLIC

CANCEL OF
NOTICE OF
DEFAULT
$0.00

10/2/2001

170167
708/463

10/9/2001
11:37 AM

9/10/2001

168926
703/91

9/12/2001
10:30 AM

142503
606/117

1/11/2000
11:10AM

12/27/1999

142153
605/148

1/4/2000
1:59 PM

12/15/1999

141420
602/429

12/17/1999
9:44 AM

General - 703/91 168926 (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM)

Parry Edwin B

Grgich Rodney
Frank

NOTICE OF
DEFAULT

Grgich Rodney
Jr

$0 00

-

General - 602/429 141420 (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM)

Parry Edwin B

Grgich Rodney

RECONVEYANCE 12/27/1999
$0.00

general -J4Q/Q4 123677 (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM)

Utah Mtg Center Alva R
Inc
Trustee /6500
Jensen Ivan O
Trustee

ASSGN OF
TRUST DEED
$0.00

Jensen
Marguerite C
Trustee /3500
Pollett E Trustee
e

e l 60 /4 9

_? Jl !l l i ^ J. l?°J 6 / -? / 2 ° 0 6 7 : i 2 . : 0 0 p M ) .
Grgich Rodney
Frank
Grgich Rodney
Jr

41

Parry Edwin B
Utah Mtg Cent
Inc

TRUST DEED
$20,000.00

OfficialDocument Note - General - ASSGN OF TRUST DEED (0000/0000) (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM)
OfficialDocument Note - General - ASSGN OF TRUST DEED (0000/0000) (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM)
OfficialDocument Note - General - TRUST DEED (0602/0429) (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM)
OfficialDocument Note - General - TRUST DEED (0602/0429) (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM)

Utah Mtg Center Jensen Ivan O
Co-Trustee
Jensen
Marguerite C Co
-Trustee
J?eJ2e!2, L?46/84 ll 3 . 6 ?!

1/8/1999

125352
551/319

1/27/1999
12:37 PM

1/14/1999

124885
550/38

1/20/1999
8:39 AM

TRUST DEED
$12,000.00

12/22/1998

123677
546/84

12/23/1998
11:37 AM

ASSGN OF
TRUST DEED
$0.00

1/2/1998

105403
486/190

1/9/1998
12:30 PM

ASSGN OF
TRUST DEED
$0.00

&9!P®67AM°fMJ

Beardshall D
Roger

Grgich Rodney
F

Parry Edwin B

Parry Edwin B

SUB OF
TRUST/RECON
$0.00

Gerieraf ^484/335 104753J6/9/2006 7-42'00 PM)

Grgich Rodney

Parry Edwin B

Grgich Rodney
Frank Jr

Utah Mtg Center
Inc

Pacific Rim
Financial
Services Corp

Beardshall D
Roger

251500/0/0
251501/0/0

Created 2/5/2007 4:40 PM
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Parcel Abstract
^General - 484/335 04753 (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM)

Grgich Rodney
F

Johnson Paul H TRUST DEED
$2,495.00
Pacific Rim
Loans
Corporation

Johnson Jamis
M Trustee

Grgich Brittney
Kaye

12/22/1997

104753
484/335

12/23/1997
3:03 PM

87974
432/431

8/21/1996
1:42 PM

8/5/1996

87973
432/429

8/21/1996
1:37 PM

2/2/1996

83055
418/807

3/28/1996
1:28 PM

2/28/1996

82919
418/360

3/25/1996
1:10 PM

12/19/1995

80436
411/564

12/29/1995
11:28 AM

79345
408/357

11/16/1995
11:59 AM

RECONVEYANCE 8/5/1996
$0.00

Grgich Rodney
Frank
Grgich Rodney
Jr
General - 408/357 79345 (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM)
Johnson Jamis
M Trustee

Grgich Brittney
Kaye
Grgich Rodney
Frank

CANCEL OF
NOTICE OF
DEFAULT
$0 00
-

Grgich Rodney
Jr
General - 408/357 83055 (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM)
Johnson Jamis
M Trustee

Grgich Brittney
Kaye

NOTICE OF
DEFAULT

Grgich Rodney
Frank

$0 00

'

Grgich Rodney
Jr
^General - 408/357 (6/9/2006 7:42:00^PMJ _
Jenson Ivan O Grgich Rodney SUB OF
F
TRUST/RECON
Surety Title
„
• ,
<m
n
$ 0 n0 0
Agency
Surety Title
Agency

S?eILer2l lPl/6I

(^/2J?„°6 7 ii 2 i2°.f M ).

Ivan Orville
Jensen Trust

Grgich Rodney
F

SUB OF
TRUST/RECON

Jensen Ivan
Orville

Surety Title
Agency

$0 00

-

Surety Title
Agency
General - ADDED TO LG LEGAL 8/4/04 KL (6/9/2006 7:42:00PM)
General ^388/65 (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM)
11/15/1995
Grgich Rodney Horman Dan
TRUST DEED
Frank
50% Int
$19,000.00
Grgich Rodney
Jr

Knute III LLC
50% Int

Grgich Brittney
Kaye

A?H~3

4 of 5

Created 2/5/2007 4:40 PM

Parcel Abstract
Jensen Ivan 0

Surety Title
Agency

SUBSTITUTION
OF TRUSTEE
$0.00

8/15/1995

76577
401/562

8/22/1995
1:04 PM

NOTICE OF
DEFAULT
$0.00

5/5/1995

73756
394/799

5/5/1995
2:16 PM

4/17/1995

73445
394/80

4/21/1995
11:07 AM

73444
394/78

4/21/1995
11:06 AM

71274
388/840

1/18/1995
11:11 AM

70881
388/65

12/23/1994
11:12 AM

General - 388/65 (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM)
Realty Title
Insurance
Agency

Grgich Rodney

General - 388/65 (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM)
General - FIXED LG LEGAL 7/10/04 KL (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM)
Realty Title
Insurance
Agency Inc

Grgich Rodney
F

NOTICE OF
DEFAULT
$0.00

General - 388/65 (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM)
General - 7/30/04 ADDED LG LEGAL KL (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM)
Jensen Ivan
Orville

Realty Title
insurance
Agency Inc

SUBSTITUTION
OF TRUSTEE
$0.00

4/17/1995

General - 388/65 (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM)
_Genera! -_ADD TOLG J^GAL7/30/04 KLJ6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM)
Pacific Rim
Financial
Services Corp

Ivan Orville
Jensen Trust U
DT

ASSGN OF
TRUST DEED
$0.00

1/5/1995

General - 388/65 (6/9/2006 742:00 PM)
General - ADDED TO LG LEGAL 7/30/04 KL (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM)
Grgich Rodney
F

Pacific Rim
Financial
Services Corp

TRUST DEED
$5,000.00

12/20/1994

General - ADDED TO LG LEGAL 7/30/04 KL (6/9/2006 7:42:00 PM)
Tooele County
Assessor

Grgich Brenda
Kathleen
Grgich Brittney
Key

GREENBELT
WITHDRAWAL
$0.00

7/2/1990

35146
305/35

7/12/1990
4:27 PM

FARMLAND
ASSESSMENT
APPLICATIO
$0.00

7/12/1990

35145
305/34

7/12/1990
4:02 PM

Grgich Frank
Grgich Rodney
Frank
Grgich Rodney
Jr
Grgich Rodney
Frank
Grgich Rodney
Jr

PUBLIC

Grgich Brenda
Kathleen
Grgich Brittney
Kaye
Grgich Rodney
F

A. r> u _ U

Created 2/5/2007 4:40 PM
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Parcel Abstract
Grgich Rodney

Grgich Marlin

EASEMENT
$0.00

4/6/1990

34067
302/755

5/7/1990
7:46 PM

Grgich Rodney
Frank

Grgich Brenda
Kathleen JT

QUIT CLAIM
DEED

1/25/1990

32124
299/30

1/25/1990
1:22 PM

Grgich Brittney
Kaye JT

$0 00

-

Grgich Rodney
Frank JT
Grgich Rodney
JrJT
Eggett Anna G

Grgich Marlin

PERSONAL REP
DEED
$0.00

1/24/1990

32118
298/841

1/24/1990
4:00 PM

Grgich Rodney

Grgich Marlin

QUIT CLAIM
DEED
$0.00

1/2/1990

32117
298/840

1/24/1990
4:00 PM

Eggett Anna

Grgich Rodney
Frank

PERSONAL REP
DEED
$0.00

1/24/1990

32116
298/838

1/24/1990
4:00 PM

Bush & Gudgell
Inc

Grgich Rodney
F

NOTICE OF LIEN
$0.00

1/22/1990

32080
298/757

1/22/1990
4:09 PM

Parents of parcel number 05-048-0-0008
(The number of generations is indicated by the number of *'s before the parcel number.)

Children of parcel number 05-048-0-0008
Generation 1

Generation 2

Generation 3

Generation 4

Generation 5

ft-O^-^

Generation 6

BOOK.

3IL
07088!

WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO

PAGE. V**'

PT-

r

Padfic Rim Financial Grotto
5Xs 136 South Main Street #700
f£*
Salt Lake City, Utah
J
L84101
Name

~

9U DEC 2 3
^ ^
-AB

DONNA S. McK?:KDr.;;r:
TOO/ClE COUNTY RECORDER

d.w/i*-

DEPUTY

- S P A C E ABOVE THIS LINE F O R RECORDER'S U 5 E -

DEED OF TRUST
WITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS

20 th
This Deed of Trust, made this.
. day o f , December
Rodney F, Grqich
whose address is
H.C.R. 31 Box 5 7 , Dugway, Utah 84022
(Street and number)
Inwest

Title

Services

,

t

(City)

_ 19

2JL, between
, as TRUSTOR,

(State)

Utah corporation, as TRUSTEE, and .

Pacific Rim Financial Services, Corporation

_ as BENEFICIARY,

W i t n e s s e s : That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described
property, situated in
TOOele
__ County, State of Utah:

3-2-L
Beginning a t Southeast corner Northwest 1/4 Section 4, Township 3 South,
Range 4 West, Salt Lake Meridian, North 13.33 Rods, West 160 Rods, South
13.33 Rods, East 160 Roads t o Beginning.
Beginning 660 Feet East of Northwest Corner of Northeast 1/4 of Section
32, Tonwship 2 South, Range 4 West, S a if Lake Base and Meridian, Running
Thence East 1537.80 Feet, Thence South 668.73 F e e t , South 89 Deg 37'01"
West 125 Feet; Thence south 0 Deg 20'48" East 101.8 Feet, South 89 Deg
37'02" West 72 F e e t , Thence North 0 Deg 2 0 ! 4 8 " West"41.3 F e e t , South 89 Deg 3 7 ! 0 2 " West
344.8 F e e t , Thence South 0 Deg 20*48" East 72 F e e t , West 996 F e e t , Thence North 801.23
f e e t to Beginning.

4*~
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements,
hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof, SUBJECT,
HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to snd conferred upon Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits.
Por the Purpose of Securing:
( I ) payment of the Indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date hereof In the principal sum of f
*2 , £ > Q O .
foiO
,
made by Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the time*, In the manner and with Interest a t therein set forth, a n / a n y extension* and/or r *
newak or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of each agreement of Trustor herein contained} (3) the payment of such additional loam or ad-

.
J^
i f a l l W ^ ^ **** P ° r t ^ Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder sholl not operate as a waiver of such right and the waiver by
Benefklary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other or subsequent defauH.
16. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any i n d e b t e d * * * secured hereby or in the performance of any
agre«nent hereunder, all sum. secured hereby shall immediately become due ond payable at the option of Benefkiory. In the event of such default.
Beneficiary may execute or cous* Trustee to execute a written notice of default and of election to cause said property to be soW to satisfy the obligat i o n hereof, ond Trustee sholl file such notice for record In each county wherein said property or some part or parcel thereof Is situated. Beneficiary
also sholl deposit with Trustee, the note and all documents evidencing expenditures secured hereby.
17. After the lapse of such time as may then be required by taw following the recordation of said notice of default, and notice of default and
notice of sale having been given as then required by law. Trustee, without demand on Trustor, shall sell said property on the date and at the tune
and place designated in sold notke of sale, either as a whole or in separate parcels, and In such order as it may determine (but subjoct to any satutory
right of Trustor to direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several known lots or parcels, shall be sold), of public auction to the highest
bidder, the purchase price payable In lawful money of the United Stoles at the time of sale. The person conducting the sale may, for ony cause he
deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to time until H shall be completed and, in every such case, notice of postponement shall be given by
public declaration thereof by such person at the time and pioce last appointed for the sale; provided, if the sale is postponed for longer than one day
beyond the day designated in the notke of sale, notice thereof shall be given in the same manner as the original notke of sale. Trustee shall execute
and deliver to the purchaser its Deed conveying said property *o sold, but without any covenant of warranty, express or implied. The recitals In the Deed
of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Beneficiary, may bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply
the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs ond expenses of exercising the power of sole ond of the sale, including the payment of the Trustee's
ond attorney's fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such sate ond revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed; (3) all sums expended
under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at
per annum from date of expenditure; (4) all qther sums then secured hereby;
and (5) the remainder, if any, to the person or persons legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, In Its discretion, may deposit the balance of such pro.
ceeds with the County Clerk of the county In which the sole took place.
18. Trustor agrees to surrender possession of the hereinabove described Trust property to the Purchaser at the aforesaid sale, immediately after
such sale, in the event such possession has not previously been wmndbnd
by Trustor.
19. Upon the occurence of any default hereunder. Beneficiary shall have the option to declore all sums secured hereby immediately due ond payable and foreclose this Deed of Trust in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled
to recover in such pwdlngt
a l l costs ond expenses Incident thereto, including o reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be fixed by the court.
20. Benefieiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County Recorder of each county in which said
property or some part thereof is tltuated, a substitution of trustee. From the time the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to
oil the powers, duties, authority and title of the trustee named herein or of ony successor trustee. Eoch such substitution shall be executed and ocknowl.
edged, ond notice thereof shall be given ond proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law.
2 1 . This Deed of Trust shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, devisees, administrators, executors,
successors ond assign*. All obligations of Trustor hereunder on Joint and several. The term "Benefkiory" shall mean the owner ond holder, including
ony pledgee, of the n«9 secured hereby. In this D^d of Trust, whenever me context so nqulr**, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or neuter,
•ond the singular number includes the plural.
22. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Deed of Xru%t, duly executed ond acknowledged, is mode a public record as provided by law. Trustee is not
obiigoted to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other Deed of Trust or of any action or proceeding in which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee
shall be a party, unless brought by Trustee.
23.

This Deed of Trust shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah.

24. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale hereunder be mailed to him at the address herein*
before set forth.

Signature of Trustor

sy_^X^>

<_S^><^^^.tZ.

STATE
County
19, ' y

personally appeared before me .

NotaryFUBlic, Reaidini"il

personally appeared before roe .
, who being by me duly sworn did say, each tor aims*!*, that he, the said .
Secretary
, President, and he, the saldL,
to the .
_, and that the within and foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by
. and .
authority of a resolution of its Board of Directors, and said each duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same and that the seal affixed Is the seal of said corporation. .
My Commission expires:

.

*7

WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO:

BOOR

Wasatch Credit Corp.

2£32

^(IMff'Q[f£f£—

0 793 4 5
PAr>r

220 South 200 E a s t #110

rw l/H/

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

95 NOV 16 AMIWS9
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TRUST DEED

THIS TRUST DEED is made this 15th day of November, 1995,
between, Rodney Frank Grgich, Rodney Grgich Jr., and Brittney Kaye
Grgich whose address is 4311 N. Cochrane Lane, Erda Utah, as
Trustor.
Jamis M. Johnson, Esq., as Trustee.
Knute III, LLC
Beneficiary.

50% Interest

and Dan Horman

50% Interest,

as

TRUSTOR hereby COVENANTS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST,
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property situated in
Toooele County, Utah:
See attached addendum "A"

Jr,

together with all water rights owned by Rodney Grgich
Rodney Frank Grgich and Brittney Kaye Grgich.

TOGETHER with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon
and all water rights, rights of way, easements, rents, issues,
profits,
income,
tenements,
hereditament,
privileges
and
appurtenances thereunto now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said
property, or any part thereof;
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING payment of the indebtedness
evidenced by a Trust Deed Note, of even date herewith, in the
amount of:
Ninetten thousand Dollars

$19,000.00

Payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the
manner and with interest as therein set forth, and Payment of any
sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary to protect the security
hereof.
Trustor agrees to pay all taxes and assessments on the above

jay

property, to pay all charges and assessments on water or water
stock used on or with said property, not to commit waste, to
maintain adequate fire insurance on improvements on said property,
to pay all costs and expenses of collection (including
Trustee's and attorney's fees) in event of default in payment
of the indebtedness secured hereby and to pay reasonable Trustee's
fees for any of the services performed by Trustee hereunder,
including a reconveyance hereof. If any property taxes or insurance
fees are not paid, the beneficiary at Knute III, LLC and Dan
Hormans option may pay the taxes, and charge twenty percent of the
tax payment as a penalty, and charge thirty six percent interest on
the tax payment, penalty, and accrued interest compounded daily.
The Beneficiary requests that a copy of any notice of default
and or any notice of sale hereunder be mailed to him at the address
hereinbefore set forth.

Rodney^ranV-Grgich

11\15\95

11\15\95

Brittney $aye Gr<£Jch

11\1J5\95

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

:ss.
)

On the 15th day of November, 1995, personally appeared before
me, Rodney Frank Grgich, Rodney Grgich Jr., and Brittney Kaye
Grgich the signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly
acknowledged to me that they executed the same.

f

I$8rm 1

Notary Public
My Commission Expires
Residing at

^^rtf

y\
1-Amd. 1-62

1 0 4 7 5 3 B0 4 S 4
DATE 23-DEC-1997 15Z03PH

FEE:

P 0335

18.00 CHECK

DONNA S. i1CKENDRICK> RECORDER
F I L E D BY I1RT

WHEN RECORDED MAE. TO
Name
Street
City/state

1/?OR PACIFIC RIH FINANCIAL SERVICES
^TOOELE COUNTY CORPORATION
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DEED OF TRUST
WITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS

This D e e d of Trust, made this 22 day of December, 19 97, between Rodney F. Gtpch

as TRUSTOR,

whose address is 4311 North Cochrane Lane, Tooele, Utah, 84074 , and PAUL H. JOHNSON, attorney, as
TRUSTEE, and PACIFIC RIM Loans CORPORATION, as BENEHCIARY, 136 South Main Street #500, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84101
Witnesses: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, W T H POWER OF
SALE, the following described property, situated in Tooele County, State of Utah:

LEGAL DESCRIPTION:

PARCEL #

See attached Exhibit "A".

05-048-0-0008

PROPERTY ADDRESS : 4311 Cochrane Lane, Tooele, Utah, 84074

Together with all buildings, fixtures, built-in appliances and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of way, easements, rents,
issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed
with said property, or any part thereof, SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred
upon Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits.
For the Purpose of Securing;
(1) Payment of the mdebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date hereof in the principal sum of 2,495.00 made by Trustor,
payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals
or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or
advances as hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory note or notes reciting that
they are secured by this Deed of Trust; and (4) the payment of all sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the
terms hereof, together with interest thereon at the highest contract rate of interest set forth in the Promissory Note or notes secured by
this Deed of Trust until paid, as herein provided.
To Protect The Security of This Deed of Trust, Trustor Agrees:
1. To keep said property in good condition and repair; not to remove or demolish any building thereon; to complete or restore
promptly and in good and workmanlike manner any building which may be constructed, damaged or destroyed thereon; to comply
with all laws, covenants and restrictions affecting said property; not to commit or permit waste thereof; not to commit, suffer or
permit any act upon said property in violation of law; to do all other acts which from the character or use of said property may be
reasonably necessary, the specific enumerations herein not excluding the general; and, if the loan secured hereby or any part thereof
is being obtained for the purpose offinancingconstruction of improvements on said property Trustor further agrees:

J?Jz

by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to collect the same. Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right by
Beneficiary to collect, shall be, or be construed to be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an
assumption of liability under, nor a subordination of the Hen or charge of this Deed of Trust to any such tenancy, lease or option.
13. Upon any default by Trustor hereunder, Beneficiary may at any time without notice, either in person, by agent, or by a receiver to
be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of Beneficiary as such receiver), and without regard to the
adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby secured, enter upon and take possession of said property or any part thereof, in
its own name sue for or otherwise collect said rents, issues, and profits, including those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, less
costs and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, upon any indebtedness secured hereby, and in
such order as Beneficiary may determine.
14. The entering upon and taking possession of said property, the collection of such rents, issues, and profits, or the proceeds of fire and
other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking or damage of said property, and the application or release
thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any default or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done pursuant 10 such
notice.
15. The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as a waiver of such right and the
waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other or subsequent default.
16. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of
any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due and payable at the option of Beneficiary. In the
event of such default, Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee to execute a written notice of default and of election to cause said
property to be sold to satisfy the obligations hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice for record in each county wherein said
property or some part or parcel thereof is situated. Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and all documents
evidencing expenditures secured hereby.
17. After the lapse of such time as may then be required by law following the recordation of said notice of default, and notice of default
and notice of sale having been given as then required by law, Trustee, without demand on Trustor, shall sell said property on the
date and at the time and place designated in said notice of sale, either as a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order as it may
determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor to direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several known
lots or parcels, shall be sold), at public auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States
at the time of sale. The person conducting the sale may, for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to time until
it shall be completed and, in every such case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration thereof by such person at
the time and place last appointed for the sale; provided, if the sale is postponed for longer than three days beyond the day designated
in the notice of sale, notice thereof shall be given in the same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver
to the purchaser its Deed conveying said property so sold, but without any covenant of warranty, express or implied. The recitals in
the Deed of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof, Any person, including Beneficiary, may bid at
the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs and expenses of exercising the power of sale and of
the sale, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with
such sale and revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed; (3) all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest
at the highest contract rate of interest set forth in the promissory note or notes secured by this Deed of Trust
from date of
expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any, to the person or persons legally entitled thereto;
or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County Clerk of the county in which the sale
took place.
18. Trustor agrees to surrender possession of the herein above described Trust property to the Purchaser at the aforesaid sale,
immediately after such sale, in the event such possession has not previously been surrendered by Trustor.
19. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder, Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums secured hereby immediately due
and payable and foreclose this Deed of Trust in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and
Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceedings all costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's
fee in such amount as shall be fixed by the court.
20. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County Recorder of each county in
which said property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From the time the substitution is filed for record, the
new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. Each
such substitution shall be executed and acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner
provided by law.
21. This Deed of Trust shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, devisees, administrators,
executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of trustor hereunder are joint and several. The term "Beneficiary" shall mean the
owner and holder, including any pledge, of the note secured hereby. In this Deed of Trust, whenever the context so requires, the
masculine gender includes the feminine and/or neuter, and the singular number includes the plural.
22. Trustee accepts this trust when this Deed of Trust, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public record as provided by law.
Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other Deed of Trust or of any action or proceeding in
which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless brought by Trustee.
23. This Deed of Trust shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah.
24. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale hereunder be mailed to him at the
address hereinbefore set forth.
Signature of Trustor

STATE OFUJAH
County of T < V , p \ j l
On the , 3 , 3

day of

, A.D. 19

\ \ > f

personally appeared before me

_kodn/j—E—hfa\tS
X4
LCJT 6ltCV^
the signer \J

^

of the within ir&irument, who duly acknowledged to me that

My Commission expires: ^ J l V \ l [ .

?J 1

rxY\

\

executed the same.
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Notary Public, Residing at

STATE OF UTA$
County of
On the

personally appeared before me

, A.D. 19

day of

and
who being by me duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, the said
is the

, is the

President, and he, the said

Secretary

, and that the within and foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said

of

corporation by authority of a resolution of its Board of Directors, and said
and

each duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same and

that the seal affixed is the seal of said corporation.
My Commission expires:

_______________________________ - ______ - ___« - - ^
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REQUEST FOR FULL RECONVEYANCE
(To be used only when indebtedness secured hereby has been paid in full.)

J

To
The undersigned is the legal owner and holder of the note and all other indebtedness secured by the I
within Deed of Trust. Said note, together with all other indebtedness secured by said Deed of Trust has been I
fully paid and satisfied; and you are hereby requested and direaed, on payment to you of any sums owing to I
you under the terms of said Deed of Trust, to cancel said note above mentioned, and all other evidences of
indebtedness secured by said Deed of Trust delivered to you herewith, together with the said Deed of Trust
and to Reconvey, without warranty, to the parties designated by the terms of said Deed of Trust all the estate
now held by you thereunder.

Dated

, _9
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Date 23-DEC-1998 lls37am
Fees
19.00 Check
??!&# fa flg^ENORICK, Recorder
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UTAH MORTGAGE CENTER, INC.
1568 S. 500 W., #101
BOUNTIFUL, UT 84010
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DEED OF TRUST
WITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS

T h i s D e e d o f T r u s t , made this 2 2 N P day of DECEMBER, 19 1998 . between RODNEY G R G I C H
A N D R O D N E Y F R A N K G R G I C H TR. as TRUSTOR, whose address is 4311 C O C H R A N E LANE
TOOELE U T 84074 , and Edwin B. Parry, attorney, as TRUSTEE, and UTAH MORTGAGE CENTER,
I N C . as BENEFICIARY, 1568 S. 500 W., #101, Bountiful, Utah 84010.
W i t n e s s e s : That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, WITH POWER OF
SALE, the following described property, situated in TOOELE County, State of Utah:

LEGAL DESCRIPTION: SEE ATTACHED ADDENDUM

PARCEL*05-048-0-0008
PROPERTY ADDRESS : 4311 COCHRANE LANE TOOELE UT 84074

Together with all buildings, fixtures, built-in appliances and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of way, easements, rents,
issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed
with said property, or any part thereof, SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred
upon Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits.
For the Purpose of Securing:
(1) Payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date hereof in the principal sum of $12,000.00 made by
Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein set £ortht and any extensions and/or
renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional
loans or advances as hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory note or notes
reciting that they are secured by this Deed of Trust; and (4) the payment of all sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or
pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest thereon at the highest contract rate of interest set forth in the Promissory Note or
notes secured by this Deed of Trust until paid, as herein provided.
To Protect The Security of This Deed of Trust, Trustor Agrees:
1. To keep said property in good condition and repair; not to remove or demolish any building thereon; to complete or restore
promptly and in good and workmanlike manner any building which may be constructed, damaged or destroyed thereon; to comply
with all laws, covenants and restrictions affecting said property; not to commit or permit waste thereof; not to commit, suffer or
permit any act upon said property in violation of law; to do all other acts which from the character or use of said property may be
reasonably necessary, die specific enumerations herein not excluding the general; and, if the loan secured hereby or any part thereof
is being obtained for the purpose offinancingconstruction of improvements on said property Trustor further agrees:

by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to collect the same. Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right by
Beneficiary to collect, shall be, or be construed to be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an
assumption of liability under, nor a subordination of the lien or charge of this Deed of Trust to any such tenancy, lease or option.
13. Upon any default by Trustor hereunder, Beneficiary may at any time without notice, either in person, by agent, or by a receiver to
be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of Beneficiary as such receiver), and without regard to the
adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby secured, enter upon and take possession of said property or any part thereof, in
its own name sue for or otherwise collect said rents, issues, and profits, including those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, less
costs and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, upon any indebtedness secured hereby, and in
such order as Beneficiary may determine.
14. The entering upon and taking possession of said property, the collection of such rents, issues, and profits, or the proceeds of fire and
other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking or damage of said property, and the application or release
thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any default or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done pursuant to such
notice.
15. The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as a waiver of such right and the
waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other or subsequent default.
16. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of
any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due and payable at the option of Beneficiary. In the
event of such default, Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee to execute a written notice of default and of election to cause said
property to be sold to satisfy the obligations hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice for record in each county wherein said
property or some part or parcel thereof is situated. Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and all documents
evidencing expenditures secured hereby.
17. After the lapse of such time as may then be required by law following the recordation of said notice of default, and notice of default
and notice of sale having been given as then required by law, Trustee, without demand on Trustor, shall sell said property on the
date and at the time and place designated in said notice of sale, either as a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order as it may
determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor to direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several known
lots or parcels, shall be sold), at public auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States
at the time of sale. The person conducting the sale may, for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to time until
it shall be completed and, in every such case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration thereof by such person at
the time and place last appointed for the sale; provided, i£ the sale is postponed for longer than three days beyond the day designated
in the notice of sale, notice thereof shall be given in the same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver
to the purchaser its Deed conveying said property so sold, but without any covenant of warranty, express or implied. The recitals in
the Deed of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Beneficiary, may bid at
the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs and expenses of exercising the power of sale and of
the sale, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such
sale and revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed; (3) all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at
the highest contract rate of interest set forth in the promissory note or notes secured by this Deed of Trust
from date of
expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any, to the person or persons legally entitled thereto;
or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County Clerk of the county in which the sale
took place.
18. Trustor agrees to surrender possession of the herein above described Trust property to the Purchaser at the aforesaid sale,
immediately after such sale, in the event such possession has not previously been surrendered by Trustor.
19. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder, Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums secured hereby immediately due
and payable and foreclose this Deed of Trust in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and
Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceedings all costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's
fee in such amount as shall befixedby the court.
20. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County Recorder of each county in
which said property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. Prom the time the substitution isfiledfor record, the
new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. Each
such substitution shall be executed and acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner
provided by law.
21. This Deed of Trust shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, devisees, administrators,
executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of trustor hereunder are joint and several. The term "Beneficiary" shall mean the
owner and holder, including any pledge, of the note secured hereby. In this Deed of Trust, whenever the context so requires, the
masculine gender includes the feminine and/or neuter, and the singular number includes the plural.
22. Trustee accepts this trust when this Deed of Trust, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public record as provided by law.
Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other Deed of Trust or of any action or proceeding in
which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless brought by Trustee.
23. This Deed of Trust shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah.
24. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale hereunder be mailed to him at the
address hereinbefore set forth.
Signatttre of Trustor

STATE OF UTAH
^
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the signer
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of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that

My Commission expires:
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NOTARY PUBLIC —
ROBERT L.K1ME
136 South Main
Salt Late City, UT 8 4 1 0 1 .
My Commission Expires
June 13th, 1999
} SS.STATEOFUTAH

STATE OF UTAH
County of
On the

, A.D. 19

day of

personally appeared before me
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executed the same.
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Notary Public, Residing at

, A D . 19

personally appeared before me

and
who being by me duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, the said
is the

President, and he, the said

of

Secretary

, is the

, and that the within and foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said

corporation by authority of a resolution of its Board of Directors, and said
and

each duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same and

that the seal affixed is the seal of said corporation.
My Commission expires:

Notary Public, Residing at
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REQUEST FOR FULL RECONVEYANCE
(To be used only when indebtedness secured hereby has been paid in full.)

To
The undersigned is the legal owner and holder of the note and all other indebtedness secured by the
within Deed of Trust. Said note, together with all other indebtedness secured by said Deed of Trust has been
fully paid and satisfied; and you are hereby requested and directed, on payment to you of any sums owing to
you under the terms of said Deed of Trust, to cancel said note above mentioned, and all other evidences of
indebtedness secured by said Deed of Trust delivered to you herewith, together with the said Deed of Trust
and t o Reconvey, without warranty, to the parties designated by the terms of said Deed of Trust all the estate
now held by you thereunder.

I Dated
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Fees
18.00 Check

WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO
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CALLEEN B. PESHELL, Recorder
Filed By RGL
For ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY
TOOELE COUNTY CORPORATION

UTAH MORTGAGE CENTER, INC.
1568 S. 500 W., #101
BOUNTIFUL, UT 84010

SPACE ABOVE THIS LINE FOR RECORDER'S USE

DEED OF TRUST
WITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS
This Deed of Trust, made this 15TH day of DECEMBER 19 99, between RODNEY FRANK GRGICH
.~

& RODNEY GRGICH TRas TRUSTOR, whose address is 4311 NORTH COCHRANE LANE: ERPA,

^}

UT 84074 . and Edwin B. Parry, attorney, as TRUSTEE, and UTAH MORTGAGE CENTER. INC. as

CO

BENEFICIARY, 1568 S. 500 W., #101, Bountiful, Utah 84010.

J£

Witnesses: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, WITH POWER OF

t

1

SALE, the following described property, situated in TOOELECounty, State of Utah:

LEGAL DESCRIPTION:

ocbm%-b'0oo%

?ARCEL:
PROPERTY ADDRESS: 4311 NORTH COCHRANE LANE; ERDA,UT 84074

Together with all buildings, fixtures, built-in appliances and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of way, easements, rents,
ssues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed
vith said property, or any part thereof, SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred
upon Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits.
For the Purpose of Securing:
(1) Payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date hereof in the principal sum of $20,000.00 (TWENTY
THOUSAND DOLLARS) made by Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein
et forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of each agreement of Trustor herein
contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when
tfvidenced by a promissory note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Deed of Trust; and (4) the payment of all sums expended
or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest thereon at the highest contract rate of interest
ret forth in the Promissory Note or notes secured by this Deed of Trust until paid, as herein provided.
To Protect The Security of This Deed of Trust, Trustor Agrees:
v. To keep said property in good condition and repair; not to remove or demolish any building thereon; to complete or restore
promptly and in good and workmanlike manner any building which may be constructed, damaged or destroyed thereon; to comply
with all laws, covenants and restrictions affecting said property; not to commit or permit waste thereof; not to commit, suffer or
permit any act upon said property in violation of law; to do all other acts which from the character or use of said property may be
reasonably necessary, the specific enumerations herein not excluding the general; and, if the loan secured hereby or any part thereof
is being obtained for the purpose offinancingconstruction of improvements on said property Trustor further agrees:

C^^S

fy.it

by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to collect the same. Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right by
Beneficiary to collect, shall be, or be construed to be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an
assumption of liability under, nor a subordination of the lien or charge of this Deed of Trust to any such tenancy, lease or option.
13. Upon any default by Trustor hereunder, Beneficiary may at any time without notice, either in person, by agent, or by a receiver to
be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of Beneficiary as such receiver), and without regard to the
adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby secured, enter upon and take possession of said property or any part thereof, in
its own name sue for or otherwise collect said rents, issues, and profits, including those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, less
costs and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, upon any indebtedness secured hereby, and in
such order as Beneficiary may determine.
14. The entering upon and taking possession of said property, the collection of such rents, issues, and profits, or the proceeds offireand
other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking or damage of said property, and the application or release
thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any default or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done pursuant to such
notice.
15. The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as a waiver of suchrightand the
waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other or subsequent default.
16. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of
any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due and payable at the option of Beneficiary. In the
event of such default, Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee to execute a written notice of default and of election to cause said
property to be sold to satisfy the obligations hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice for record in each county wherein said
property or some part or parcel thereof is situated. Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and all documents
evidencing expenditures secured hereby.
17. After the lapse of such time as may then be required by law following the recordation of said notice of default, and notice of default
and notice of sale having been given as then required by law, Trustee, without demand on Trustor, shall sell said property on the
date and at the time and place designated in said notice of sale, either as a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order as it may
determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor to direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several known
lots or parcels, shall be sold), at public auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States
at the time of sale. The person conducting the sale may, for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to time until
it shall be completed and, in every such case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration thereof by such person at
the time and place last appointed for the sale; provided, if the sale is postponed for longer than three days beyond the day designated
in the notice of sale, notice thereof shall be given in the same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver
to the purchaser its Deed conveying said property so sold, but without any covenant of warranty, express or implied. The recitals in
the Deed of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Beneficiary, may bid at
the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs and expenses of exercising the power of sale and of
the sale, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such
sale and revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed; (3) all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at
the highest contract rate of interest set forth in the promissory note or notes secured by this Deed of Trust
from date of
expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any, to the person or persons legally entitled thereto;
or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County Clerk of the county in which the sale
took place.
18. Trustor agrees to surrender possession of the herein above described Trust property to the Purchaser at the aforesaid sale,
immediately after such sale, in the event such possession has not previously been surrendered by Trustor.
19. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder, Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums secured hereby immediately due
and payable and foreclose this Deed of Trust in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and
Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceedings all costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's
fee in such amount as shall befixedby the court.
20. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time byfilingfor record in the office of the County Recorder of each county in
which said property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From the time the substitution isfiledfor record, the
new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. Each
such substitution shall be executed and acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner
provided by law.
21. This Deed of Trust shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, devisees, administrators,
executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of trustor hereunder are joint and several. The term "Beneficiary" shall mean the
owner and holder, including any pledge, of the note secured hereby. In this Deed of Trust, whenever the context so requires, the
masculine gender includes the feminine and/or neuter, and the singular number includes the plural.
22. Trustee accepts this trust when this Deed of Trust, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public record as provided by law.
Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other Deed of Trust or of any action or proceeding in
which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless brought by Trustee.
23. This Deed of Trust shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah.

